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Abstract 
This mixed-methods study focused on the internal human factors responsible for data 
breaches that could cause adverse impacts on organizations. Based on the Swiss cheese 
theory, the study was designed to examine preventative measures that managers could 
implement to minimize the potential data breaches resulting from internal employees’ 
behaviors. The purpose of this study was to provide insight to managers about developing 
strategies that could prevent data breaches from cyber-threats by focusing on the specific 
internal human factors responsible for data breaches, the root causes, and the preventive 
measures that could minimize threats from internal employees.  Data were collected from 10 
managers and 12 employees from the business sector, and 5 government managers in 
Ivory Coast, Africa. The mixed methodology focused on the why and who using the 
phenomenological approach, consisting of a survey, face-to-face interviews using open-
ended questions, and a questionnaire to extract the experiences and perceptions of the 
participants about preventing the adverse consequences from cyber-threats. The results 
indicated the importance of top managers to be committed to a coordinated, continuous effort 
throughout the organization to ensure cyber security awareness, training, and compliance of 
security policies and procedures, as well as implementing and upgrading software designed 
to detect and prevent data breaches both internally and externally.  The findings of this 
study could contribute to social change by educating managers about preventing data 
breaches who in turn may implement information accessibility without retribution. 
Protecting confidential data is a major concern because one data breach could impact 
many people as well as jeopardize the viability of the entire organization.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Propagation of network communications has changed the nature of businesses, 
resulting in an unprecedented magnitude of threats and vulnerabilities to business 
information systems.  Security risks from data breaches fall into the following four basic 
patterns, which were first identified by Auray and Kaminsky (2007): integration as an 
employee, opting to be independent, the path of fraud, and parallel remuneration under a 
masked identity.  This categorization is still used today to understand then modes through 
which many internal data breaches occur.  Many security hackers use these approaches to 
build progressively split identities as hackers and professionals.  
Although there have been many theories about data breaches, many historical 
theories are still relevant in the context of increasing numbers of data breaches due to 
external and internal human factors.  Pierce’s test (1976) of Durkheim’s (1951) social 
order theory is still relevant and a useful method to understand the role of human factors 
in systems attacks and data breaches.  Durkheim theorized that social and economic 
changes contribute to the disturbance of existing goals and norms that push people into 
novel social settings.  These individuals use essential means such as malicious malware 
to attain their intrinsic objectives, which could be economic, religious, political, 
retributive, or social.  Similarly, the motivation for committing cyber-crimes has multiple 
facets such as external threats as well as internal threats from employees, both deliberate 
and accidental.  These threats frequently become viable because of a lack of involvement 
by some top managers in the development of organizational plans and efforts designed to 
mitigate cyber-attacks.  Thus, the results of this study could have positive social 
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implications by providing insights on how managers and organizational leaders can 
prevent data breaches and protect organizational as well as customer information.  
Background of the Study 
The proliferation of emerging information technology (IT) is a primary reason for 
economic and technological advancements across Africa.  Advancement in IT has 
changed the nature of business activities and has permitted businesses, governments, and 
consumers to buy, sell, or request services via the Internet.  Additionally, the financial 
industry, governments, customers, and many other organizations and individuals access 
their information or make transactions over the Internet.  Businesses and governments are 
communicating more than ever with their customers virtually and globally through 
network communications.  This global network of electronic communication systems has 
increased business transactions rapidly and has transformed the nature of data exchange 
worldwide.   
This expansion of information processes also has increased risks significantly.  
Threats have expanded from mass malware and industrialized attacks that target 
individuals and their access privileges to long-term exploits of the more adept adversary, 
whose tactics are difficult to discern from a legitimate user’s activity (Forrester, 2011).  
The potential for cyber-crimes has increased in sophistication by outpacing defenses.  
With the Internet of things (IoT), a large number of people are using smart 
devices, which seem to be intelligent enough to be dangerous.  As more mobile devices 
become IP-enabled, they are instrumental in BotNets because a cyber-hacker may infect 
the mobile devices with malicious software and control them without the owners’ 
3 
 
knowledge through spam, inappropriate messages, or other platforms used for distributed 
attacks.  Tracing the sources of the distributed attacks are difficult while overwhelming a 
target is easier.  In past years, activists and blackmailers have used distributed denial of 
service attacks, while many cybercriminals have used distributed reflection denial of 
service attacks.  The latter focuses on a handful of protocols, including the simple 
network management protocol (SNMP), which is an application layer (Layer 7) protocol 
commonly used to manage devices with IP addresses. 
Unlike other distributed denial of service and distributed reflection denial of 
service attacks, the SNMP attacks permit malicious actors to hijack unsecured network 
devices such as routers, printers, cameras, and sensors and use them as bots, which are 
web robot scripts to attack third parties.  The SNMP attacks are a major concern because 
a number of devices could be compromised easily, including remote devices such as 
printers and sensors which, generally, are not secured, leaving them open to exploitation.  
Devices such as sensors used in motion detectors, control valves at power plants, door 
locks for bank vaults, and traffic signals can be compromised easily as well.  Search 
engines such as Shodan could reveal such connected devices, many of which are entirely 
without security.  
The stateless protocol such as user datagram protocol used by SNMP is subject to 
IP spoofing, which is a forgery or fake IP address.  A reflection denial of service (DoS) 
attack using SNMP is an amplification attack because an SNMP request generates a 
response that is typically at least three times larger, which could allow an attacker to port-
scan a range of IP addresses to identify exploitable SNMP hosts.  An attacker sends an 
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SNMP request to these hosts using the spoofed IP address of the target server, while 
replies of hosts saturate the bandwidth of the target, making it unavailable.  The raw 
response size of the traffic is amplified significantly, enabling the SNMP reflection attack 
vector to become a dominant force. 
The sources of data breaches continue to grow.  McAfee (2014), which is a 
provider of endpoint security software, reported that there were nearly 8 million new 
pieces of malware just in the third quarter of 2014.  Additionally, malicious and high-risk 
mobile apps are on the rise.  Trend Micro (2014), for instance, identified 195,000 
malicious Android apps in September 2014.  Preventing malware attacks on systems is 
still a challenge with emerging mobile devices and concepts, such as bring your own 
device (BYOD), which is a growing threat with an increase in smartphones and tablets 
that are available in the market.  Even though smartphone sales declined by 1.3% in 
2014, mobile phone sales reached 2.5 billion units in the world.  This proliferation creates 
significant challenges for cyber-security personnel, whereas rendered network 
communications are even more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
Most IT managers and top organizational leaders continue to view cyber-terrorism 
and attacks by hackers as top security concerns together with malware infections and 
application vulnerabilities.  Moreover, the list of significant security concerns is growing 
in length and diversity.  As a result, the exposure footprint is expanding due to the BYOD 
movement in the work environment.  From a security perspective, implications of BYOD 
involve more untrusted devices connecting into corporate networks and enterprise public-
facing websites; consequently, as more mobile devices become accessible, employees 
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may participate in malware propagation and BotNet-based attacks, leading to significant 
data breaches.  
Many organizations may not be able to change either the BYOD phenomena or 
how they conduct their operations.  Networks, whether they are private or public, are 
circulatory systems of the business.  Malicious and unwanted traffic clogs these 
electronic arteries and increases risks that may impact maintaining stable operations, 
reaching profitability objectives, managing brand reputation, complying with regulations, 
and safeguarding sensitive data.   
Many organizations rely on an assortment of gateways and filters to purify their 
network traffic to diminish these risks.  Although logical, this approach is dependent on 
the effective and timely identification of threatening traffic, prevention of intrusion, and 
updating security policies and malware and intrusion signatures with equal accuracy and 
speed.  However, this critical task is difficult due to the involvement of many factors, 
such as steady escalation in traffic volume and origins, evolving network and computing 
infrastructures, traffic patterns, and hacker sophistication in evading detection and 
gaining access (Adebayo, 2012).  In many organizations, employees may exploit the 
company’s trust for personal gain or malicious intent by exposing the company’s 
sensitive information and data to a third party.  These resilient threats increase 
significantly when considering the unprecedented volume and magnitude of external 
threats to internal vulnerabilities that lead to data breaches causing major disaster 
recovery efforts in government and business information systems in the Ivory Coast.   
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Data breaches have their roots in politics as well as in the lure of easy money, 
notoriety, and personal or malicious motivations.  Therefore, understanding the impacts 
of human behavior on the creation of dysfunctional information processing could help to 
secure information systems to prevent data breaches and compromised information.  
Increasing data breaches and human errors impede information availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity, which are significant concerns to many organizations and 
citizens because data breaches are getting worse and information is compromised more 
frequently.  As a result, data breaches from human errors could weaken an organization’s 
ability to exercise a greater level of dynamic control over its valuable information leading 
to a loss of public trust.  Decision makers of most organizations should understand the 
impact of data breaches and their role as leaders in preventing cyber-threats that impact 
the organization.   
Problem Statement 
The general problem I investigated in this study was the internal human factors 
contributing to data breaches that adversely affect many organizations.  The specific 
problem was how managers could protect the information system of an organization 
against internal human factors that contribute to data breaches, and could minimize 
threats to cyber-security ecosystems in Ivory Coast, Africa (see Dutta & McCrohan, 
2011).  Many researchers and security practitioners agreed that successful cyber-attacks 
are due to data breach triangulation hackers use to gain access to information systems.  
Many financial institutions and other organizations continue to suffer the consequences 
of data breaches through human factors, social environments, or system flaws.  A report 
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by the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC, 2014) indicated that in January 2014, 
Target, which is a popular discount retailer, stated that hackers stole more than 70 million 
credit and debit card data between November 27 and December 15, 2013.  In October 
2013, hackers accessed 5.6 million social security numbers and other personal data since 
1998 from servers at the South Carolina Department of Revenue (SCDOR, 2013).  
Symantec (2013) underlined that the majority (88%) of reported data breaches were due 
to attacks by outsiders.  A report by the International Organization of Security 
Commissions (IOSCO, 2013) indicated that 53% of stock exchanges were under cyber-
attacks during 2012.  McAfee (2014), an endpoint security software provider, reported 
that there were nearly 8 million new malwares just in the third quarter of 2014.  The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, 2013) took a more holistic 
approach to information security and risk management due to emerging cyber-threats and 
emphasized that maintaining cyber-security hygiene is critical to the availability of 
information residing in systems. 
Purpose of the Study  
Cyber-threats come from both external and internal sources. However, the 
purpose of this study was to provide executive managers with a guideline to prevent data 
breaches from cyber-threats by focusing on internal sources because many organizations 
in Ivory Coast and other African countries have less effective information systems 
security controls, resulting in pervasive vulnerabilities, undetected breaches, and 
unknown amounts of damages and thefts.  These deficiencies place Ivory Coast 
information systems assets at risk for inadvertent or deliberate misuse and financial 
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information at risk for unauthorized exposure.  From my perspective, it seemed that the 
Ivory Coast government has delegated many central IT responsibilities to the French 
government and private IT contractors in France.  In addition, IT contractors appeared to 
not understand Ivorian human behavioral aspects, while executive managers did not seem 
to know anything about overseas contractors.  Furthermore, it appeared that the 
government did not establish any clear guidelines about which IT operations should be 
kept in-house.  Similarly, many African governments appear to lack an overall plan to 
function effectively because of their deep divisions and changing focus due to political 
instability, causing dysfunctions in the decisions of managers.  Consequently, data 
breaches are often unnoticed due to the unavailability of information and the lack of a 
framework to protect critical infrastructures from cyber-threats.  Ivory Coast has seemed 
to face increasing cyber-security challenges with the proliferation of emerging 
technologies and network communication devices in the knowledge-based global 
economy.  I examined the significant cyber-security challenges that Ivory Coast 
businesses face and what role top executives and managers could play in overcoming 
human factors that contribute to internal data breaches.  
Research Questions  
I developed the following three research questions for this study: 
RQ1: What are the internal human factors that contribute to data breaches and 
compromised information in the Ivory Coast emerging business environments?  
RQ2: What are the root causes of the internal human factors that contribute to 
data breaches and compromised information in the Ivory Coast businesses?  
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RQ3: What preventative measures could managers use to minimize the threat 
from human factors, which are related to an internal employee, that contribute to data 
breaches or compromised information? 
These research questions were linked to a survey and open-ended interview 
questions that provided the basis for the collection of data discussed in Chapter 4.  
Participants were Ivorian government executives, financial executives, IT managers, and 
information systems technicians, who had at least 3 years of experience in their positions.  
I used the collected data to determine the significance of dysfunctional managerial 
processes and the impacts on managerial decisions. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The Swiss cheese model of human error was the primary theory used in this 
study.  The theory holds that flaws exist in each layer and could lead to an accident if 
they are aligned despite many layers of defense between hazards and accidents.  This has 
historically been a problem for managers.  During the last 25 years, many researchers 
have proposed similar taxonomies.  For example, Swain and Guttman (1983) argued that 
organizational conditions contribute to human errors.  Miller and Swain (1987) found that 
inadequate workspace and work layout, poor environmental conditions, derisory human 
engineering design, insufficient training and job aids, and poor supervision were the 
causes of human errors.  Other researchers such as Perrow (1984), Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1992), Roberts (1990), and Sagan (1994) studied the impacts of organizational culture 
on the incidence of human errors.  However, the Swiss cheese model is useful because it 
forces investigators to address latent failures within a causal sequence of events.  
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Although this model is a simple theoretical framework, it is not a prescriptive 
investigation technique and only has a few details on how to apply it in a real-world 
setting.  Executive-level and IT managers should find out what holes there are, how big 
they are, and how they correlate so that they can be detected and corrected before an 
accident occurs (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997).  Although these references are over 20 
years old, there is an urgent need to mitigate human errors in the context of growing data 
breaches, which cause increasing economic and operational damages to organizations 
today.   
Many data breaches happen due to human negligence within organizations.  A 
Computer Security Institute (2013) report indicated that over 46% of 351 survey 
participants stated that human errors and factors resulted in the most cost and damage to 
the organization.  Monitoring employees and security awareness training remain lesser 
concerns for many organizations despite increasing global cyber-attacks.  A cost-benefit 
analysis is often used to justify resource allocations, though obtaining accurate estimates 
for costs versus benefits is difficult.  Using inaccurate data could undermine the quality 
of resource allocation decisions in combating data breaches.  In 2013, the Computer 
Security Institute (CSI), in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
conducted an annual computer e-crime and security survey and found that the motivation 
for stealing intellectual property and proprietary information is for financial gain (CSI, 
2013).  Studies by the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), 
Australia, Canada, News Zealand, and the United Kingdom also showed that incidents 
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involving human errors and factors remained a big concern for many organizations (US-
CERT, 2018).   
The outcomes of these and other studies indicated that the problems due to human 
errors and factors are real and pervasive.  Some key findings reported by the Secret 
Service and Carnegie Mellon (2014) on human errors and recurring factors in 
organizations indicated that data breaches primarily happened due to the errors of 
insiders.  Current employees caused the majority (56%) of incidents, followed by 
customers (32%).  Similarly, they found that executives neither documented and 
consistently enforced policies nor had periodic security awareness training for all 
employees (Cummings, Lewellen, McLntire, Moore, & Trzeciak, 2014).  Unreported 
incidents are a key challenge in deriving these statistics.  In 2013, the study by the CSI 
and FBI indicated that only 42%, which was up from 25% from previous year, reported 
incidents to law enforcement (CSI, 2013).  Similarly, the 2013 e-crime survey results 
indicated that two-thirds of cyber-crimes committed due to human errors were dealt with 
internally and not reported to law enforcement (CSO,2013).  Reasons for not reporting 
incidents included loss of reputation, negative publicity, increased liability, inability to 
identify the perpetrator, and the acceptance that damage was not sufficient enough to 
report due to lack of skilled professionals (CSO, 2013).  Unfortunately, the full impact of 
human errors will remain unknown unless top managers document and report to 
information assurance researchers so that they can analyze available cases related to 
human errors for possible solutions.  Preventing human errors threat is critical and 
complex because employees are the most common points of entry in security breaches.   
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Employees have authorized accesses to the systems and information of 
organizations, and they have the inside knowledge of intuitive information operation 
systems of organizations.  Security breaches due to human errors and their impacts come 
in many forms; in most cases, those errors are related to individuals’ roles and 
responsibilities.  Although a threat mitigation effort to overcome human errors and 
factors is complex and challenging, a risk management approach can be useful to guide 
the process.  The probability of intervention by managers to prevent attacks or limit the 
damage done by attacks is slim because many managers and supervisors have less time 
and are likely to overlook many warning signs.  
Human errors have the potential to cause harm from accidents.  A cyber-crime 
survey showed that cyber-crime threats are on the rise and current attempts to counter 
them frequently continue to be unsuccessful.  Many organizations could not defend 
themselves effectively against human errors and factors, and end users have limited or no 
technical expertise (PWC & CSO, 2013).  Propagation of network connections and 
mobile devices have enabled employees to conduct and easily conceal their activities.  
Additionally, many organizations could not rival the persistence, tactical skills, and 
technological prowess of their potential cyber-adversaries.  
Generally, people do not have malicious intent when they commit an error.  Most 
human errors happen accidentally because of a lack of due diligence practices, which are 
designed to prevent data breaches.  However, there are malicious intents involving 
employees who use their trusted access privileges to intentionally impair the organization 
when there are no roles and responsibilities for checks and balance.  This deliberate harm 
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might be sabotage, destruction, theft, embezzlement, espionage, and so forth (Adebayo, 
2012).  Consequently, it is necessary for an organization to determine the human factors 
that might expose it to risks before data breaches occur.  Correlation is a mathematical 
tool used frequently for analyzing a series of values, such as a time series, and for 
measuring the degree to which two or more quantities are linearly associated (Weisstein, 
2008).   
Autocorrelation is the correlation of a data set with itself.  Autocorrelation 
analyzes serial dependency of data, that is, knowing the total time to resolve events today 
and what could be inferred about the time to resolve events tomorrow.  Correlation time 
is used for analyzing security infrastructure because understanding relationships between 
incidents help analysts uncover hidden patterns in human factors.  Trends are often more 
valuable than individual snapshots because baselines could be established to determine if 
operations are improving or declining across a wide range of security infrastructures.  
Because human behavior is at the core of information asset risks and consequently plays 
an essential role in the protection of such assets, the theoretical framework for this study 
was the Emmanuel and Daniele’s (2011) theory of culturally-aware IT.  This theory 
addresses the theoretical and technological aspects of IT about humans and their culture.   
This theoretical approach provided the details on cultural awareness and insider 
human behavior that affected information systems and technology in general.  The 
approach offered guidance  to understand the internal human factors that contributed to 
internal data breaches and to prevent these data breaches.  Additionally, it provided 
insights into the social environmental challenges and methods to overcome the human 
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factors that contribute to data breaches in order to minimize the adverse consequences of 
cyber-attacks.  
Conceptual Framework 
Information and data of many organizations are vulnerable to cyber-attacks across 
the globe due to the proliferation of network communications.  Cyber-criminals use 
several approaches to gain unauthorized accesses to data of the affected organizations.  I 
explored two basic approaches to generating an attack graph, namely the state-based 
approach proposed by Ammann, Wijesekera, and Kaushik (2002) and the host-based 
approach proposed by Ammann, Pamula, Ritchey, and Street (2005).  However, several 
previous approaches have utilized both forward and backward chaining algorithms to 
develop an attack graph and to understand the objective of an attacker.  Thus, to attain 
reachability of an attack graph, it is critical to determine all ports and hosts in a network 
that are reachable via TCP or UDP connections from all interfaces on all hosts in a 
network.  Therefore, the state-based approach gives information at a more granular level, 
whereas the representation quickly becomes large and complicated even for a modest size 
network (Sheyner, Haines, Jha, & Wing, 2002).  In a host-based attack graph, each node 
could be identified as a network entity and the edges may be privileges obtained after 
applying exploits among them.  The host-based approach gives compact representations, 
which are used in visual representation and handled scalability at the cost of abstracting 
several low-level details related to exploiting correlation, vulnerability, and attacker 
privileges.  For example, obtaining user-level privilege on a host, say Host AB, and 
escalation of that privilege to the superuser level, could be treated as two distinct states in 
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the state-based approach.  Additionally, the attack graph shows weaknesses in the system 
for administrators and assists them to decide appropriate security measures to deploy.  
This host-based approach enables the combination of all individual privileges and retains 
the highest-level privilege as a graph edge.  Availability of low-level details in a state-
based attack graph depends on the level of risks that executives are willing to accept or 
reject if there was a system threat.  
In the approach proposed in this study, I used the state-based forward chaining 
algorithm to generate an attack graph with the necessary exploits.  The necessary exploits 
were the set of exploits, a subset of which could be used by an attacker, to obtain the goal 
because the forward reachable attack graph might contain redundancies.  The runtime 
complexity of such a forward chaining algorithm could be represented by the polynomial 
O (|A|2. E), where A and E represent the number of network state of beings and exploits, 
respectively, and where each vertex in the generated attack graph edges is used to 
represent the causal relationship among network states and exploits (Ammann et al., 
2002).  Additionally, a system administrator could discover how an actual attack might 
occur within a system by using a backward search in the state-based forward chaining 
algorithm. 
Identifying and predicting threats require an understanding of the behaviors of 
cyber-attackers.  An attack graph could help to organizations identify the most likely 
network attacks.  To achieve this objective, securing the network using generated attack 
paths and applying the Boolean minimization are the best logical options (Sheyner et al., 
2002).  The proposed in-depth risk management methodology could be classified as: (a) 
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detection and removal of cycles onward accessible attack graph, (b) identifying all attack 
paths frontward available directed acyclic attack graph, (c) identifying the minimum 
possible network securing options for risk mitigation, and (d) identifying the likelihood 
attack path based on attack surface measure. 
An attacker might use the stack and queues concept to exploit a vulnerability in 
network nodes of an organization to access data.  However, the system administrator 
could use the state-based forward reachable attack graph if an attacker used a stack and 
queues concept of business data.  The state-based forward reachable attack graph 
represents each pre and post-clause of the highest point and their contributory 
relationship, allowing the system administrator to see the rims loop algorithm, where the 
attack took place (Ammann et al., 2002).  Consequently, a system administrator could 
have better visibility of the cause of the attack.  Having a better visibility of business 
network communications is essential for IT managers to prevent cyber-attacks.  Since 
2000, several practitioners recommended that testing network communication was and 
still is critical to secure the internal network connectivity from remote attack (Jajodia, 
Singhal, Islam, Long, & Atluri, 2008).  This approach demonstrates the methods used by 
cyber-criminals to launch an attack on the network by exploiting data vulnerability of an 
organization through a remote buffer overflow.    
A successful execution of this attack immediately permits the attacker to gain the 
control of a network to steal business information remotely.  The interloper used a 
solitary computer to send known exploit to access information that resided in the 
network.  Thus, it is essential to have a non-redundant authentication in attack replica 
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approach to minimize data breaches (Ammann et al., 2002).  In conjunction to these 
approaches, the British Standard BS 7799, the International Standards Organization 
17799 (ISO 17799), the Generally Accepted Information Security Principles, the System 
Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model, and the Standard of Good Practice for 
Information Security delineated the best security practices for stakeholders involved in 
protecting information assets.  Moreover, the Federal Information Security Management 
Act of 2002 (FISMA) and the NIST recommended mandatory security controls to 
mitigate data breaches or systems attacks.  
Nature of the Study 
Threats to business network communications have increased as interdependency 
of computer systems continue to increase rapidly.  As a result, it is a challenge for many 
banks and organizations to provide efficient, secure, and documented access to their 
information systems at all levels from internal employees and contractors to external 
partners and customers.  Most organizations do not have the technology to allow their 
system administrators to act in real-time and enforce access to computer systems across 
highly complex and ever-expanding business network environments.  Many organizations 
are unable to create, modify, and delete user accounts, user profiles, and corporate 
policies, and cannot correlate data from human resources, financial, travel, procurement, 
and email systems. 
Therefore, I used a mixed-method approach in this study because it is suitable for 
understanding internal human behavioral aspects that play vital roles in data breaches, 
compromised information, and confidentiality in many organizations.  My focus on how 
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the processing of information could positively improve decisions and minimize data 
breaches was consistent with Emmanuel and Daniele’s (2011) theory of culturally-aware 
IT.  This theory helped me explain how human factors contribute to both external and 
internal data breaches and compromise information systems of many organizations.  
Thus, the objective of this research study was to determine how IT managers and top 
managers could control internal and external human factors to prevent data breaches.  
This research should help to pinpoint how collaborative processes are crucial to minimize 
data breaches and compromised information, where dysfunctional managerial functions 
are a danger to cyber-security ecosystems.  
Definitions 
Below I have provided operational definitions of keywords I used throughout the 
study. 
European Union Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Personal Data: This is 
a legislative act of the European Union (EU) that requires member countries to meet 
certain requirements for data privacy protection without specifying the process.  The 
impact has spread to the U.S. due to strict requirements governing the transfer of data to 
non-EU nations (EU Directive, 1995). 
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA): As defined by 
NIST, it is a law governing information security practices within U.S. Federal 
government agencies that requires annual audits of information security within each 
agency (FISMA, 2002).   
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Human error: Human error is defined at least in three ways: phenomenological, 
scheme lumps, and human biases or tendencies (Reason, 1990).  
Human factor: The human factor is the relationship between technology and 
humans. It marks information related to human behavior, abilities, and limitations, and is 
taken into consideration during the design of tools, machines, systems, tasks, jobs, and 
environments for effective, productive, safe, and reliable human use. 
In addition, I have developed the following definitions based on personal IT 
experience. 
Computer security threat: The probable danger resulting from the exploitation of 
a vulnerability. 
Cyber-security ecosystem: The interaction of public-private organisms and law 
enforcement to protect the critical infrastructures, national security, and economic 
interests of a country. 
Data breach: A security incident in which sensitive, protected, or confidential 
information is released intentionally or unintentionally to an untrusted environment. 
Data mart: A data repository designed to serve a community of knowledge 
workers based on bona fide need. 
Disclosure (Disc): When information is revealed to an unauthorized individual. 
Fraud: The deliberate misuse or misapplication of organizational resources or 
assets for personal gain or any theft of information by an insider. 
Insider: A current or former employee, or temporary employee or contractor 
including business partners or customer, authorized end-user of IT resources of the 
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organization.  Three common insider threats are fraud, theft of intellectual property, and 
sabotage of IT infrastructure.  
Intellectual property theft: The use of IT by an insider to steal or expose valuable 
information assets of an organization. 
Loss: When an asset is found in an unintended location and not where it was 
supposed to be, or when an asset cannot be located. 
Risk: The association of threat, vulnerability, and impact. 
Sabotage of IT infrastructure: The use of IT by an insider to harm IT resources of 
an organization. 
Security vulnerability: An unintended flaw in software code or a system that can 
lead to a potential exploitation in the form of unauthorized access or malicious behavior 
(i.e., viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and other forms of malware). 
Theft: When an asset is thought or known to have been taken without the 
permission of the responsible person.  
Assumptions 
The primary assumption of this study was that employees have an impact on 
assets, policy, and process of an organization and how they may affect data and other 
assets technology.  Because employees are the weakest link in an organization in terms of 
data breaches, managers should have a method to overcome internal human factors 
effectively to minimize cyber-threats.  Another assumption of this study was that the 
intended purposely selected sample of participants from five different organizations, 
consisting of Ivorian government officials, financial executives, chief information 
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officers, IT managers, and information systems technicians, was sufficient in responding 
to the survey and the interview questions in contributing to answering the research 
questions.  
Scope  
In this study, I addressed how people were an essential part of overall security and 
how they affected an organization’s information assets.  I focused only on overcoming 
data breaches, resulting from internal employees in information systems of an 
organization.  Furthermore, I did not address in this study the technical design of 
information systems.  There were 27 participants in this study purposely selected from 
five different organizations, consisting of five Ivorian government officials, four financial 
executives, five chief information officers, six IT managers, and seven information 
systems technicians, who had at least three years of experience in their position.   
The focus of this study was to address the significance of dysfunctional 
managerial processes and their impacts on decisions to overcome data breaches and 
human factors related to information systems.  Each participant received the survey 
questionnaire, which had an average completion time of fewer than fifteen minutes each, 
and the interview took approximatively thirty minutes.  Moreover, the participants 
received an opportunity to review a compilation of the questionnaire responses, survey, 
and interview notes to ensure that the transcription was accurate, and their anonymity is 
protected.  The entire process took less than 60 minutes to complete.  
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Limitations 
There were several limitations to this study.  First, the continued involvement of 
all participants was critical to the success of this study.  Though the participants were 
volunteers without any compensation, they participated until the completion of this study.  
Second, there was the possibility that some participants provided diverse answers to 
survey, questionnaire and interview questions because of their cultural and ethnic 
differences.  To minimize such risk, the participants answered the same set of questions.  
Although the participants came from five different organizations, they had the 
opportunity to ask any questions about the study.  Lastly, five organizations and their 
participants were not perfect representations of decision-makers and end users in their 
organizations.   
Significance of the Study 
This project is significant because a large number of people have had their 
information compromised almost daily across the globe, and it seems to be getting worse.  
Preventing data breaches in organizations could prevent sensitive information about 
citizens from being exposed.  Data breaches have adverse consequences for both 
corporations and consumers.  Organizations, in particular, could face severe 
repercussions to their businesses, resulting in financial loss and reputational damages.  
Major data breaches often attract extensive media coverages, and, in some cases, a class 
action lawsuit filed by the affected customers against the company.  In 2018, Facebook 
reported that data from 50 million users have been compromised, and the lawyers are 
lining up to file class action cases against the company.  
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Attackers tend to form a wicked community of learners, taking notes and sharing 
tips via the Internet.  For example, typical cyber-thieves target local credit unions or 
regional banks.  Some scholars found that the use of attack trees has been successful 
generally in identifying threats and risks to systems (Edge, Raines, Grimaila, & Baldwin, 
2007).  Protection trees are used, in conjunction with attack trees, to evaluate trade-offs 
between risk mitigation processes and to calculate the probability of each attack scenario 
affecting victims, which allowed the defender to identify attacks that exceed their risk 
tolerance.  These countermeasures could help to model and determine the behavior of the 
adversaries.  Also, attack trees captured and documented factors of the risk analysis. 
Attack trees analysis approaches are valuable tools to demonstrate due diligence 
in the event of data breaches (Ingoldsby, 2009).  Other researchers suggested using the 
textual clustering and data mining theory, which used probabilistic latent semantic 
indexing to generate links among documents, topics of interest, and people.  From these 
links, an interest profile for an individual could be generated (Trillo, Po, Ilarri, 
Bergamaschi, & Mena, 2011).  Therefore, the core of this research was to contribute to 
information security literature, in which only limited information is available about data 
breaches and human factors in the Ivory Coast.  Although the focus of attack and 
protection trees was generally on the determination of overall system risk, the 
methodology was applicable equally to human factors threat domain.  Attack trees 
formally represented all attack vectors and helped to determine which events might occur 
for an attack to be successful.  It was important to begin determining risk level at each 
node to calculate metrics, such as the impact to a system if an action is accomplished 
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(Edge et al., 2007).  Determining risk level of each node within the network of an 
organization was one possibility to pinpoint the likelihood of risk in the event of an 
attack. 
Security practitioners are worried primarily about a DoS attack as a distraction for 
cyber-theft to use in combination with malware like SpyEye, Zeus, and Citadel.  
Criminals were hitting businesses that used small to mid-sized banks by distracting their 
victims for hours in a DoS attack on a bank.  When an organization or individual could 
not confirm wire transfers because the bank network is down, the chances of being 
defrauded increase significantly.  The Verizon 2009 data breaches investigation report 
highlighted that 93% of over 285 million records compromised in 2008 were from 
financial services firms.   
Attackers continue to pursue soft targets internationally and create increased 
concern in emerging economies, especially concerning consumer data.  Data thieves 
showed no partiality between larger enterprises and smaller establishments because they 
base their attacks on the perceived value of data and convenience (Verizon, 2009).  A 
report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2014) showed that the 
cost of cyber-crimes increased from $375 billion in 2011 to $575 billion in 2013.  Therefore, 
preventing data breaches and human errors and factors is critical, especially in the Ivory 
Coast, which appears to have dysfunctional managerial processes of information.  
Because of the limited research on this topic specific to Ivory Coast, this research could 
fill this gap by analyzing the significance of the problem of apparent data breaches and 
human factors that affected decision-making process to safeguard the information of 
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citizens.  The results of this research could enhance Ivory Coast cyber- ecosystems by 
preventing data breaches and overcoming internal human errors and factors to minimize 
cyber-threats.   
Significance to Practice 
A study by Ponemon Institute, LLC (2014) on data breaches confirmed that a 
strong security posture helped organizations to reduce the cost of a data breach by $14 
per record and lead to significant reduction in losses.  Lost or stolen devices, third-party 
involvement in incidents, and notification and engagement of consultants increased the 
per capita cost of data breaches.  Additionally, data breaches involving the lost or stolen 
devices could also lead to losses, for instance, cost per record could surge by $161.10 if a 
data breach involving lost or stolen devices (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2014).  Verizon 
(2014) security experts also recommended the following controls to mitigate data 
breaches: 
• do not use single-factor password authentication for anything that faces the 
Internet; 
• set up automatic patches for any content management system such as Drupal 
and WordPress; 
• fix vulnerabilities right away before hackers find them; 
• enforce lockout policies; and 
• monitor outbound connections. 
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Therefore, these advance practices demonstrate the criticality of top management 
involvement when dealing with employees’ human errors and factors related to the 
system of organizations, applications, and data.  
Significance to Theory 
Data breach mitigations could be expressed as mathematical objects to model, 
analyze, construct, and determine the likelihood of preventing a data breach.  The time 
that a problem lingers within the system or organization is an indication of the 
effectiveness of data breach prevention.  The correlation time provides information about 
the average amount of time needed to recover from an incident.  This measure could be 
expressed as the relationship between amounts of overlap in security events after 
removing fluctuations for weekly and daily trends, as well as for any periodic trends that 
might become apparent over more extended periods.  Correlation time is relative to the 
current baseline of organizations, or to last month performance versus this month, or as 
compared to the target correlation time an organization established to minimize threats. 
The autocorrelation function provides information related to future performance 
of security infrastructure.  A positive correlation together with above-mean resolve time 
for today could indicate a high-security capability and business operation for tomorrow.  
The number of security events could decline and allow security infrastructure aptitude to 
leverage additional events and to respond to the effects.  The inability of security 
operation systems to react to human behaviors could cause an individual security 
workload.  Autocorrelation helps security infrastructures to have a better oversight of 
data settings and enables an analysis of data dependency and the total time to resolve 
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incidents.  Additionally, correlation helps to uncover hidden patterns in data breaches and 
provides valuable information on system security.  Security trend baselines are designed 
to evaluate whether security operations are improving or declining within an 
organization. 
An organization security infrastructure could be expressed as mathematical 
objects to analyze and construct a secure e-transaction environment.  The strength of e-
transaction security of organizations depends on the effectiveness of their security 
infrastructure and the length of time taken bring a system online after a security incident.  
Correlation time is relative to the current baseline, or to last month performance versus an 
actual month or compared to the target correlation time of an organization. 
An organization with a security infrastructure built with appropriate functionality 
could continue to operate normally in the event of a data breach.  However, a large 
correlation time during a severe event or many simultaneous minor events could indicate 
a severe impact on business operations and security functionality.  The correlation time 
could be a security assurance measure and a business risk index for extreme or multiple 
events.   
Assessing security assurance is a recent discipline that is rapidly gaining 
momentum because government agencies and organizations realized limitations in their 
ability to measure the effectiveness of their security infrastructure.  A central tenet of 
business management is that it could not be managed effectively if it could not be 
measured.  The field approaches the security similar to other well-established disciplines, 
as a process, whose efficiencies could and might be measured with essential indicators.  
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However, the methodologies are not based on scientific and mathematical rigor that 
sustained other disciplines (Jaquith, 2007).  Measurement of security assurance requires 
the identification and quantification of metrics.  Quantification is driven by the need for 
probable security and accountability.  
Assessing security assurance is a rapidly developing field, although still lacking 
the standards and broad consensus (Applied Computer Security Associates, 2013).  The 
security assurance field has a strong demand for skilled information security 
professionals since 2007 due to the Internet global capability and availability features 
(Theoharidou & Gritazalis, 2007).  Such demand is relevant still in many organizations, 
especially in Africa.  Considerable controversies still exist regarding terms such as 
metrics, measure, score, rating, rank, or assessment results (Applied Computer Security 
Associates, 2013).  Utilization of a baseline by the metrics to compare security status to 
determine improvement is the critical distinction between metrics and measurement.    
Significance to Social Change 
As interdependency of computer systems continued to increase rapidly, threats to 
business network communications were widened.  As a result, banks and other 
organizations experienced challenges to provide efficient, secure, and documented access 
to their information systems at all levels, for internal employees and contractors as well 
as external partners and customers.  Many organizations did not provide or process 
technology to allow their system administrators to act in real-time and enforce access to 
computer systems across highly complex and ever-expanding business network 
environment.  Many organizations were unable to perform the creation, modification, and 
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deletion of user accounts, user profiles, and corporate policies as well as the correlation 
of data from human resources, financial, travel, procurement, and among others, email 
systems. 
Therefore, this study could have a social change impact because it underlined how 
to implement accessibility of information without retribution.  Protecting confidential 
data is a concern for every level of society.  Moreover, this study provided insight on how 
to prevent external intrusions and internal human factors, which facilitated decision-
makers to make better decisions and improve cyber-security ecosystems in Ivory Coast. 
Summary and Transition 
The nature of businesses is changing with more global network interconnection 
capabilities and availabilities.  Attackers are incessantly reviewing their processes and 
techniques to ensure that they gain access to systems, information, and data of 
organizations.  Despite multiple challenges in cyber-landscape, top managers of many 
organizations generally do not take proper measures to prevent data breaches, especially 
due to internal human errors and factors.   
However, some companies did not even realize they had been compromised.  
They were unable to estimate the cost of intellectual property that they had lost to a 
competitor, a thief, or another nation-state.  The tasks to protect information systems and 
data are not getting any easier because information in the world grows recurrently, and 
some companies are collecting and selling consumers information and data to other 
organization.  Cyber-criminals are adapting to current protection strategies of many 
organizations and inventing new ways to access valuable data.  Lack of security 
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awareness in many organizations leads to failures to implement even fundamental 
security practices that have been recommended by the NIST of the U.S. Commerce 
Department.  Lack of awareness about the significance and scale of threats is a serious 
and ongoing problem to manage the state of information security.  Consequently, many 
information security scholars and IT practitioners proposed methods to protect 
information assets and data of an organization adequately, which is the emphasis of 
Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Preventing data breaches and internal human factor errors is a primary concern of 
IT managers and requires responsibility from everyone with access to IT resources.  The 
number of successful data breaches is on the rise because uniformity of security across 
the industries is impossible; therefore, breaches are more likely in organizations with 
limited IT investment (Scott, 2010).  To help prevent data breaches, the researchers at the 
Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the NIST developed the test methods, 
reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analysis to advance the 
development and productive use of IT; however, it is not mandatory to implement these 
measures and they are at the discretion of  companies to decide how they would apply 
them.  In any organization, three group levels, management, information systems or IT 
practitioners, and end users play a role in protecting IT assets.  Though collaboration and 
support between each group are essential to efficiently protect from data breaches, senior 
managers play a crucial role in creating the appropriate environment to secure the IT 
assets of a business.  The security responsibilities of senior managers include establishing 
security policies, ensuring enforcement, and financing the security programs over time.  
Literature Search Strategy 
The objective for the literature review search strategy in this study was to identify 
published literature regarding data breaches and overcoming internal human errors and 
factors.  I used standard search strategies involving keyword searches of two online 
databases such as MEDLINE and Cochrane followed by the evaluation of the 
bibliographies of relevant articles.  I also used websites of relevant organizations 
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including IBM, Google Scholar, Yahoo Scholar, NIST, Penomon Institute, Verizon, and 
Symantec, especially their published information regarding data breaches and 
overcoming internal human factors in the surge of global cyber-threats.  I used the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria to identify potentially relevant peer reviewed articles, and 
evaluated the relevance of each article to the following research questions:   
RQ1: What are the internal human factors that contribute to data breaches and 
compromised information in the Ivory Coast emerging business environments?  
RQ2: What are the root causes of the internal human factors that contribute to 
data breaches and compromised information in the Ivory Coast businesses?  
RQ3: What preventative measures could managers use to minimize the threat 
from human factors, which are related to an internal employee, that contribute to data 
breaches or compromised information? 
I did not test any hypotheses in this study because of the use of qualitative mixed 
methods to understand better the internal human behaviors responsible for data breaches 
and to propose measures that managers could use to prevent breaches.  
It was also necessary for the selected articles to address one of the predictor 
variables and either quality (as measured by processes or outcomes) or cost.  
Furthermore, the selected articles must have focused on strategies that could mitigate data 
breaches, cost, and overcoming internal human factors in the growth of cyber-threats.  
For instance, the NIST Special Publication (NIST SP, 2012) provided guidelines for 
developing security assessment plans and associated security control assessment 
procedures.  The NIST is a joint task force comprising members from the U.S. 
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Intelligence Community, Department of Defense, and Committee on National Security 
Systems with the mission to develop a unified information security framework for the 
federal government and its contractors.  The SP 800-53A, Rev. 1 and 800-53, Rev. 4 
were developed to instruct organizations on enterprise-wide, near real-time risk 
management.   
Managing risks from systems in the dynamic operational environments could 
affect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the 
nations, adversely.  The guideline proposed by the NIST for developing security 
assessment plans is intended to support a wide variety of assessment activities in all 
phases of the system development life cycle including development, implementation, and 
operation (NIST SP, 2013).   
Theoretical Foundation Approach to Data Breach 
The propagation of network communications has changed the nature of 
businesses, resulting in an unprecedented magnitude of threats and vulnerabilities to 
business information systems.  According to information security theories, the behaviors 
of internal employees could have severe consequences to business information systems 
and data with the growth in network communications.  In their user behavior model, 
Aytes and Connolly (2003) emphasized users’ perceptions of risk and choice and 
indicated that information security behavior of internal employees is a result of their own 
choices.  They also argued that the behavioral choice could have personal and 
organization-wide implications (Aytes & Connolly, 2003).  The influence of individuals 
on information security has been recognized in past research studies. For example, 
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Banerjee, Cronan, and Jones (1998) underlined that individual characteristics, judgments, 
and beliefs, including organizational issues (e.g., organizational ethical climate) could 
have an impact on the ethical behavioral intentions of information security employees.  
Forcht, Pierson, and Bauman (1988) emphasized the role of employees, their attitudes, 
actions, and sense of right and wrong in addressing information system security issues.  
These end user-centric considerations indicated a social perspective on the role of 
information systems security while emphasizing the capability of people to develop 
attitudes and a sense of right and wrong independently. 
Auray and Kaminsky (2007) indicated that the security risks from data breaches 
could be categorized into four basic patterns: integration as an employee, opting to be 
independent, the path of fraud, and parallel remuneration under a masked identity.  Since 
2007, many individuals have used these procedural patterns to transform themselves into 
security hackers by developing a split identity and fragmenting their professional identity.  
The demand characteristics theory proposed by Orne (1969) is still significant and could 
help to understand some cyber-crimes.  This theory emphasizes that the influence of 
peers affects people significantly such that an individual could decide to participate in the 
ideological or physical attacks either against individuals, groups, nations, or financial 
institutions to advance their beliefs or goals.   
As a consequence of being a part of such a group, the individual could feel 
justified in fearlessly carrying out the harmful, dangerous, or even deadly tasks, ranging 
from personal assaults to mass suicide bombings because the group justifies its demands 
to execute such tasks based on ideologies.  For example, religious groups may justify 
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their actions as mandated by their god with the expectation for spiritual rewards.  
Consequently, these participants are vulnerable to adverse influences because they 
believe in the value of their religious causes with the hopes that their involvement could 
contribute to improving their stature within their religions either in this life or in the after-
life.   
With increasing cyber-threats, many organizations focus more on IT architecture 
and software to prevent intrusions, whereas they spent fewer resources on understanding 
human behaviors responsible for preventing data breaches.  Increasingly sophisticated 
data breaches have been occurring in governments and businesses ranging from major 
newspapers, defense contractors, and cutting-edge technology companies across the 
globe (Forrester, 2011).  Researchers at the Ponemon Institute LLC (2013) calculated that 
the average annual cost of data breaches for 234 organizations was $7.2 million, with a 
range between $375,387 and $58 million.  The success of advanced persistent data 
breaches continues to affect a large number of citizens due to the exposure of their 
information.  Many scholars have debated the surging problem with cyber-attacks from 
different controversial moral viewpoints.  For example, as far back as 1781, Kant stressed 
that un-equal treatment could encourage people living in an imperiled status to choose 
their actions regardless of the impacts on the society or other individuals.   
The question of universal moral standards is what if everyone did that?  The 
moral could be worthless if everyone makes a moral justification for their actions because 
each one has different moral standards.  Bentham’s (1781) notion of pleasure is still 
relevant for understanding how cyber-criminals might justify their actions (Bentham, 
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1781).  Bentham held that the justification for an action is determined by how long the 
pleasure would last, how intense it would be, and how likely it is to give further pleasure.  
People determine the degree of pleasures by subtracting any units of pain caused by their 
action.  The remaining is the happiness value of their action, and Bentham called it a 
utility because the more pleasure that an action brings about, the more useful it is to 
society.   
The principle of utility as a criterion of morals suggests that the right action 
produces a greater happiness than any alternative actions.  The objective of Bentham’s 
definition was to give words like right and wrong a descriptive connotation with an 
assumption that one should decide the right actions among various possible ways of 
acting in any given situation (Bentham, 1781).  Therefore, the criterion of morals for each 
individual could influence their participation in data breaches. 
Two basic paths to data breaches in many organizations are external and internal 
human factors.  Similarly, cyber-crimes result from a combination of elements such as 
threats from employees and lack of involvement of top managers in mitigating cyber-
attacks that damage the reputation and profit of many businesses.  After data breaches, 
many of these businesses pay a third party to monitor the credit of customers and could 
face a class-action lawsuit. 
Despite the growing number of data breaches and their negative consequences, 
the Ivory Coast government and most companies in the country appear to be inadequately 
protected from deliberate external and internal attacks, and the accidental loss of data by 
internal employees on their devices including desktops, laptops, and mobile devices.  
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Lack of appropriate managerial responses commonly results in less productivity, 
contributing to a loss in revenue generation.  Further, the loss of sensitive company 
information or the inability to prevent unauthorized access could not only add costs to 
remediate any lost data, but also tarnish the corporate brand, shake shareholder 
confidence, and increase customer and employee concerns about data privacy, especially 
given the increase of BYOD practices.   
Conceptual Framework 
The architecture of a computer network has changed with advances in technology.  
The commercial and financial sectors, including all levels of government agencies, are 
pursuing a secure computer network architecture to safeguard the integrity of information 
exchange (Florence & Swamydoss, 2011).  Nevertheless, hackers continue to steal 
personal data from computer systems on a daily basis.  The cyber-attack on the South 
Carolina Department of Revenue (SCDOR) is the most significant breach against a state 
tax agency in the U.S. and affected nearly four million taxpayers, with estimates 
approaching six million in 2012 (SCDOR, 2012).  This cyber-attack was successful 
because top managers did not ensure that SC DOR had the adequate security measures to 
protect personally identifiable information (PII) of taxpayers (SCDOR, 2012).  
Consequently, the state spent $20 million for added protection in the first year alone, and 
the state cabinet agencies and top managers were working on the security improvements.  
However, this data breach could have been prevented if top managers were willing to 
spend $25,000 on preventive measures to deter attackers to gain access to their 
information systems (Pardue, 2013).   
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This is one of the many challenges that top managers face to prevent the external 
human factors contributing to data breaches.  Therefore, top managers should focus on 
internal human factors resulting from the dysfunctional managerial functions that impact 
the security of information systems.  In the globally competitive market, the profit 
remains the most common motive for insider malicious activities and the profit motives 
are associated with money (Dutta & McCrohan, 2011).  The competitive market 
economics is possible because of the use of electronic services in the financial 
institutions, which increased the need for security, principally due to the sensitive nature 
of information exchanged.  For example, Internet banking systems require a successful 
security assessment or security evaluation process to mitigate Internet banking threats 
(Sujatha & Arumugam, 2011).  The increasing success of data breaches is achieved 
because of the impossibility to achieve the uniformity of security across all industries; 
therefore, weaker links exist in organizations depending on their IT investment (Scott, 
2010).  Additionally, the success of data breaches is related to the complex behavioral 
motivational typology in the mounting risks of computer crime, especially in the Internet 
banking environment (Malathi & Baboo, 2011).  Therefore, managers should provide 
security awareness to end users due to the complexity of security systems, and the nature 
of threats and attacks in the financial and other industries (Soerjadibrata, Jakarta, & 
Wagiyati, 2010).  The threat of systems attacks is complicated, though understanding 
data breach process is helpful to prevent attacks.   
Data breaches occur due to a series of intertwined and orchestrated events.  Six 
top-level threat categories along with the prevalence are as follows: 
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• Hacking -  31% cause of data breaches;  
• Malware -  25% cause of data breaches;  
• Misuse -  22% cause of data breaches;  
• Deceit -  12% cause of data breaches;  
• Physical - 9% cause of data breaches; and 
• Error - 1% cause of data breaches (Verizon, 2009). 
Regarding malicious action against information systems, hacking is the leading 
cause of data breaches with the extensive library of hacking and intrusion techniques.  
The latest Verizon data breach investigations report (Verizon, 2015) provides the 
outcomes of data breach investigations within 70 organizations in 61 countries. 
Accordingly, the biggest incident threats are from four categories, namely miscellaneous 
errors (29.4%), crimeware (25.1%), insider misuse (20.6%), and theft/loss (15.3%), 
whereas the biggest data breaches are post intrusions (28.5%), crimeware (18.8%), cyber-
espionage (18%), insider misuse (10.6%), and miscellaneous errors (8.1%). 
Many intrusions exploited the fundamental mismanagement of identity.  As a 
result, the intruder accessed via default and then shared the stolen credentials to a third 
party.  Poor access control lists left a wide-open door for the assailant to walk through 
unchallenged and allowed cyber-criminals to: 
• take the path of least resistance; or 
• Use the SQL injection, which appears to be the common technique for hackers 
to gain access.  This type of attack ranked second in prevalence (utilized in 16 
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breaches) and first in the number of records compromised (79% of the 
aggregate 387 million) (Verizon, 2015). 
The bulk of attacks continued to target applications and services rather than the operating 
systems or platforms, on which they run.   
Cyber-criminals used remote access services and web applications to gain access 
to corporate systems, whereas a smaller percentage of hackers targeted routers, switches, 
and other network devices.  Malware is an essential component of nearly all large-scale 
data breaches.  The most common malware delivery technique is the remote installation 
of malware after an attacker gains access to a compromised system.   
New elaborate varieties of malware utilities could bypass existing data controls 
and encryption to create vulnerable data stores for future retrieval from the victim.  
Examples include:   
• memory scrapers, which consist of sophisticated packet capture utilities and 
could identify and collect specific data sequences within unallocated disk 
space and from a page file; 
• the percentage of customized malware is 69% of all samples encountered; 
• most common in 2014 was the malware that had been created for attacks 
entirely from scratch, accounting for 87% of the 387 million records breached 
in the year; 
• most malware used to compromise data may be detectable at the internetwork 
operating system (IOS) layer three level; and 
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• overall, 25% of breaches were caused by some form of misuse, including 
social engineering and phishing scams targeting attacks (Verizon, 2015).     
Unfortunately, many organizations rely on the IOS layer three as the primary malware 
prevention and detection technique.  
Organizations should self-assess to determine whether they are a target of choice 
or a target of opportunity.  Random opportunistic attacks are when attacker(s) identified 
the victim when searching randomly or widely for weaknesses and then exploited the 
weakness, whereas the directed opportunistic attacks target the victim specially selected 
because they were known to have a particular weakness that attacker(s) could exploit.  
Similarly, fully targeted attacks occur when the victim is chosen first as the target and 
then the attacker(s) determine a way to exploit them.  Targeted attacks accounted for 90% 
of the total records compromised.  By a large margin and for the fifth year in a row, 
online data consisting of various types of servers and applications were the most 
frequently compromised assets, accounting for nearly all of the 285 million records 
breached across the 2008 caseload (Verizon, 2009).  Thus, large and remotely accessible 
data stores remained the target of cyber-criminal activity.  More records were breached in 
2008 than any other single year and more than in the previous four years combined.  The 
following top five breaches in 2008 accounted for 93% of total records compromised: 
• Payment card breaches - near 80% mark and far outnumbered other data types 
by consuming 98% of all records compromised in the year. 
• The clear majority of cyber-criminals were looking for a quick and easy 
payoff. 
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• Personal identification number (PIN) information associated with consumer 
payment card accounts were increasingly targeted in 2008. 
• These attacks involved the identification and compromise of store magnetic 
strip data, together with a PIN, setting the stage for more damaging forms of 
identity fraud. 
• PII was the second most compromised data type (Verizon, 2009). 
Credentials give attackers the prospect of increased access for illicit activity and 
attackers appear to be exploiting that advantage.  Additionally, organizations 
generally do not have a complete inventory of their IT assets, resulting in unknown 
opened ports or forgotten assets, such as: 
• a system unknown to the affected organization or business group; 
• an existing system storing data that is unknown to the organization; 
• a system that had unknown network connections or accessibility; and 
• a system that had unknown accounts or privileges. 
Approximately half of the breaches investigated in 2008 consisted of at least one 
type of unknown (Verizon, 2009).  The unknown impacts of a breached system remained 
unknowns; thus, increasing visibility and reducing variability in the IT operating 
environment should be a top priority for the risk management efforts.   
Furthermore, there were various ATM attacks throughout the world even in the 
technologically advanced countries.  Organized criminals installed cleverly disguised 
equipment on the front of an existing bankcard slot of the legitimate bank ATMs to steal 
the card number and the PIN.  The equipment had a wireless PIN reading camera and was 
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housed in an innocent looking leaflet.  Skimmers were mounted to the front of the 
standard ATM card slot that read the ATM magnetic strip and transmitted information 
wirelessly to the criminals.  The criminals copied the cards and the PIN numbers to 
withdraw cash from many accounts in a brief time directly by hacking into the cash 
machine (Krebs, 2011).  Therefore, recognizing the severity of cyber- threats helps 
organizations to shape the behavior of their customers. 
Data Breach Review Analysis 
During the last few years prior to this study, the number of data attacks has 
increased in business environments and in personal use environments.  Protecting against 
any data breaches is the precondition for any e-transaction between users and 
organizations. To protect against data theoretically, an attacker might use a hypothetical 
network, which had five nodes A to E.  The nodes represented only the system 
attackability measures, where attack surface measures were the node weights for the 
individual nodes.  To replicate the trust between the hosts, the degrees of access should 
be set in the increasing order from the initial root to the authentication process to the full 
authorization of the user.  In this situation, the practitioners suggest applying the 
algorithm, RelaxMatrix, to ensure access control on a bona fide need basis.  Also, the 
fixed conversion may not exist for mapping the qualitative aspects of security to the 
quantitative values.  Therefore, security system administrators could design a customized 
network to secure the specific needs of the business and to synchronize the network 
access levels.  To achieve this, the algorithm backtracks could be applied sequentially, 
where node C could be introduced into the stack, which acted as the pivot node.  The 
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backtracking could continue on the network because the neighboring node is reachable as 
per the adjacency of node C.   
In the hypothetical network, the algorithm then searches for an alternative path to 
avoid the black nodes.  The potential victim among the nodes is the node with the 
broadest measure of attack surface.  The algorithm once again proceeds similarly and 
selects the second largest node until it reached the end of the node.  The algorithm stops 
the search and returns the nodes falling and forming part of attack path to trace attack 
path that a potential intruder may use to commit a data breach (Manadhata, Flynn, & 
McQueen, 2006).  Manadhata et al. (2006) underlined that the traceability of an attack 
path could be verified through an authenticated access from the file transport protocol 
daemon (FTPD) for Unix systems developed at Washington University (WU).  WUFTPD 
is the most popular file transport protocol (FTP) daemon on the Internet, used on many 
anonymous ftp sites all around the world to mask a user’s identity and the Pro FTP 
daemon (ProFTPD), which is a file transport protocol n FTP server and open-source 
software compatible with Unix-like systems and Microsoft Windows.  In a hypothetical 
situation, this process reveals the vulnerability in the network at the WuFTPD and 
ProFTPD level.  The hypothetical intruder first assaults the node with higher attack 
surfaces, and then attacker tracks back to the ProFTPD algorithm.  This process could 
reveal the approach that the intruder uses to breach data if the access is not available 
(Manadhata et al., 2006).  In this hypothetical situation, the intruders could also engage in 
criminal activities because data that they obtained could be used illegally.   
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The wider use of the Internet led to an increase in criminal activities such as 
identity theft, payment card fraud, and intellectual property theft.  U.S. Department of 
Justice (2011) sentenced two Wellington men in a mail and aggravated identity theft ring.  
Wayne K. Roustan pleaded guilty to stealing credit and debit cards from a mailbox and 
using them to make purchases and cash withdrawals, costing victims $786,000 on 
February 12, 2011.  Moreover, the human error and factor threat mitigations are 
appealing and urgent with the growing data breaches in financial network transactions.  
The reported losses due to human errors were 37%, resulting in the most cost and damage 
to any organization (CSO, 2013).  Some organizations have filed civil complaints against 
some criminals.  
In March 2012, Microsoft Corporation and co-plaintiffs filed a civil complaint 
against 39 persons caught in the illegal computer network activities using the Zeus and 
SpyEye BotNets, which were computers remotely controlled by hackers.  Hackers used 
both Zeus and SpyEye to steal online banking information and then transferred funds to 
money mules or the U.S. residents with bank accounts, who could move the money out of 
the U.S.  Microsoft was granted the court approval to seize 800 domains and several 
servers in Pennsylvania and Illinois that had been used to control the Zeus and SpyEye 
BotNets.  Furthermore, the FBI arrested more than 100 Romanian-based criminal groups 
for a wire fraud scheme by selling items on Internet auction and online websites.  The 
potential buyers were asked to wire money to bogus bank accounts.  The suspected 
fraudsters received more than $10 million in reported profit, whereas the victims never 
received their purchased goods (Microsoft, 2012).   
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In another case, hackers from countries including Estonia, Russia, and Moldova 
reportedly hacked the Royal Bank of Scotland WorldPay computer network by defeating 
the encryption that was used to protect customer information associated with the payroll 
card processing system.  Hackers used counterfeit payroll debit cards to withdraw $9.4 
million of the salaries of employees from over 2,100 ATMs across at least 280 cities 
around the world, including in the U.S., Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Italy, Hong Kong, 
Japan, and Canada.  In 2011, over $9 million was lost within 12 hours (Zetter, 2011)  
Approximately 51% of the world population had an Internet connection in 2017 
(world internet users statistics, WIS, 2017).  The number of Internet users increased 
tenfold from 1999 to 2015 and reached 3.2 billion in 2015 (WIS, 2015).  Similarly, 
growing digital technologies facilitate the frauds and schemes through Internet servers 
and digital communication devices located in physical locations.  These locations might 
be different from the criminals or victims, posing the jurisdictional challenges in 
investigation and prosecution of cyber-criminals (WIS, 2014).  However, financial 
institutions and other organizations could not stay indifferent due to the environmental 
changes of threats. 
Clapper (2013) outlined that cyber-threats are the third most pressing threat to 
financial institutions and national security.  Dutta and McCrohan (2011) indicated in their 
study that profit is the most common motive for malicious activities by an insider.  The 
profit motive is associated often with power reassurance, that is, my beliefs are right, 
whereas yours are not.  Another common manifestation of profit was the modus operandi 
of espionage.  In espionage, individuals viewed selling secrets as a business rather than 
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an act of betrayal or treason.  Undercover work might be a primary activity of insider 
threat.  Two notable examples are Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames.  Former FBI agent 
Hanssen provided classified manuscripts and precise information about the U.S. 
intelligence and capabilities to Russia extracted using his authorized access and 
credentials without hoisting any suspicion.  He developed diverse methods to steal 
information and went home on many occasions quietly with confidential and classified 
documents and digital media.  Hanssen committed espionage for more than 15 years 
before being caught and pleaded guilty to receive a life in prison in 2001, even though 
there were some indicators that something was amiss.  
Between 1986 and 1994, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer, Aldrich 
Ames, provided classified human source information to the Soviet Union for over $2.5 
million (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1994).  Despite an openly spendthrift 
lifestyle, his activities went unchallenged for eight years.  This incidence highlights that 
mitigation of the human factors threat is a multidisciplinary problem requiring people, 
processes, and technology. 
Scott (2010) stated that the advantages of cloud computing to mitigate this 
problem are well-documented.  Although the system is stable in 2017, hackers might 
attack the system in the near future.  Furthermore, the security of cloud computing 
delivery model appears to be unstable despite widespread acceptance in several emerging 
markets.  These security concerns are legitimate among larger enterprises as well as small 
and medium businesses (SMBs).  Unfortunately, various security and compliance point 
solutions could influence the view about data assets of an organization.  Subsequently, 
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cloud security for one organization could be vulnerabilities for other companies, making 
the uniformity of security across all industries impossible.  
However, there might be more natural ways to ensure sufficient levels of security 
and, therefore, compliance, depending on the business core needs.  Due to a constrained 
budget or limited internal resources, information security compliance of SMBs differs 
from that of the larger enterprises because the former lacks the time and in-house skills to 
execute cost-effective controls.  Consequently, the crown jewels of banks or other 
organizations are protected in the cloud.  In the meantime, other practitioners such as 
Malathi and Baboo (2011) argued that it is critical to understanding the complex 
behavioral motivational typology in the context of increasing computer crimes, especially 
in the Internet banking environment.  They also argued the necessity to authenticate the 
identity of customers accessing Internet-based financial services.   
Many governments and business communities need new ways of conducting 
financial electronic transactions efficiently by developing a reliable and secure electronic 
transaction in the global market economy to ensure the protection of customer 
information and to reduce incidents of identity theft and fraud.  Businesses run more 
electronic transactions in heterogeneous IT infrastructures; hence, monitoring of network 
interconnectivity is a challenge.  Additionally, technology alone could not solve the 
insider threats due to human factors.  Malathi and Baboo (2011) asserted that 
organizational policies and security processes are also insufficient and still relevant in 
2018.    
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Power-reassurance included low-aggression behaviors that promoted or restored 
the self-confidence of the individual.  The power-reassurance did not focus on human 
errors that cause mischief or test their skills in handling their daily tasks to minimize data 
breaches.  Power-assertive refers to the use of moderate to high-aggression behaviors to 
promote or restore the self-worth of an individual, including a need for recognition and a 
desire to be seen as irreplaceable.  For example, an employee used a contractor badge to 
gain access to the network operations center and offsite storage facility of a company, 
stole the backup tapes and caused system failures.  The employee had hoped to be in a 
position to save the day because he had the backup tapes.  However, he was captured in 
the hidden security cameras in the network operations center and offsite storage facility.   
Anger-retaliation is another commonly associated behavioral motivation in human 
factors and includes revenge, retaliation, ideology, and sabotage.  Timothy Lloyd is the 
first American sent to prison under new laws against deleting critical organizational files.  
Lloyd sought revenge against his company after being demoted and the prosecution 
established the guilt after the forensic analysis of a hard drive found in Lloyd's garage 
revealed a time bomb code used to delete the files.  His malicious actions cost his 
organization, Omega Engineering, an estimated $10 million in damage.  Opportunistic 
malicious human behavioral threats occur when a moral conundrum arises between 
pursuing selfish and selfless actions.  Often, this behavior takes place when an 
opportunity for satisfaction coincides with the low probability of discovery.   
There is only a limited understanding of the human behavioral aspect to 
holistically approach the network systems security.  Malathi and Baboo (2011) also 
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supported research that could help to understand the human behavioral aspect holistically 
through deductive reasoning, leading to human error and factor threat mitigations.  
Understanding the human behavioral aspect, primarily related to electronic services in 
financial institutions, is critical because of the sensitive nature of information exchange 
(Sujatha & Arumugam, 2011).  Internet banking systems require an effective security 
assessment or security evaluation process to mitigate Internet banking threats.  In 
particular, information systems auditor should have the necessary knowledge, technical 
and operational skills to review the technology and the risks associated with Internet 
banking.  
A new authentication approach presented by this security assessment or security 
evaluation process provides a threshold for the end users to reduce system security risks.  
Analysis of text-based authentication using images in the banking system is the basis of 
this security assessment and provides a great value in terms of convenience, customer 
intimacy, time-saving, inexpensiveness, and coherence in banking sectors.  Nevertheless, 
security in the banking sectors remains volatile and complex.  Soerjadibrata et al. (2010) 
underlined the complexity of security systems in the financial industry and suggested 
managers to provide security awareness to the end users.  However, most end users lack 
the minimum skills and knowledge about the use of the system.  They also found that 
role-based administrator rights to control information access is a prerequisite for optimal 
performance and systems protection. 
The flow of data reporting systems and operating financial electronic transaction 
is of a security concern.  Florence and Swamydoss (2011) explained that the change in 
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computer network architecture with advances in technology such that the commercial and 
financial sectors including the government agencies are pursuing the secure computer 
network architectures to safeguard the integrity of information exchange.  Active 
networks represent a new approach to network architecture and provide a more resilient 
network infrastructure.  The network security is mainly based on the network 
architecture, which gives the security spectrum in network system architecture and 
highlights security issues.  Therefore, an inclusive design of network architecture, such as 
peer-to-peer network, client-server model, network security, authentication, national 
counter intelligent and security center, and the consideration of human factors, is 
suggested to assess security issues.   
Human factors threats have increased with the proliferation of the passwords of 
the end users.  Byungrae and Franz (2009) argued that Internet security is one of the 
latest concerns along with extensive use.  One-time password (OTP) is the first security 
medium for strengthening the stability of electronic financial transactions.  Byungrae and 
Franz (2009) proposed a method that generates the OTP key using location and 
fingerprints.  The fingerprint is one of the key personal authentication factors and could 
create a variable password key for single information use.  This approach helped reduce 
system security flaws as evident from a simulation conducted by Byungrae and Franz 
(2009). 
The multi-agent system (MAS) is another approach when dealing with human 
factors threats.  Talib, Rodziah, and Rusli (2010) suggested that the one-way secure 
financial system, which is based on the use of MAS problem-solving multi-agent 
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simulation construction of synthetic worlds collective robotics technique, could be 
beneficial to increase the security of cloud data storage.  The system users could use the 
proactive and reactive features provided by the MAS techniques for cloud data storage 
security.  A set of agent communities forms the architecture of the system.  
Moreover, MAS could be used in a cloud platform for serving the security 
developed using a collaborative environment of Java agent development.  To solve 
increasing system security concerns, MAS architecture offers several security attributes 
generated from four key security policies, namely correctness, integrity, confidentiality, 
and availability of user data in the cloud.  Talib et al. (2010) also described an approach 
for businesses to build a secure cloud platform using the MAS architecture, which uses 
specialized autonomous agents for specific security services and allow agents to interact 
to facilitate security of cloud data storage. 
Other practitioners such as Salve, Suraj, Rahul, and Harshad (2011) argued that 
technologies define the need in every sector, and it is vital that enterprises, including the 
financial sector, consider the changing needs of customers.  To satisfy the financial needs 
of customers, executives at banks have been utilizing new technologies such as the 
Internet, which led to the development of e-banking despite the problems.  However, 
using new technology such as the Internet and e-banking would not solve the security 
problems for banks without considering human factors.  The potential use of mobile 
devices in financial applications such as banking and stock trading requires an increased 
security for e-banking.  Salve et al. (2011) outlined that the objective of e-banking is to 
provide a secure environment for various types of transactions and focused on two-step 
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security for authentication, that is, the use of mobile banking and steganography to 
improve the communication channel.  To enhance the security, they proposed data 
encryption to hide the patterns and provided a system based on the biometric information, 
that is, face recognition.  
Selecting appropriate countermeasures have become a central concern for security 
practitioners due to human threats.  Granadillo, Daniel, Mustapha, Nabil, and Herve 
(2012) highlighted the necessity to have traceability of security events from the analysis 
of attacks to selecting appropriate countermeasures for the risks.  Furthermore, the design 
of network and system devices is heterogeneous with different characteristics and 
functionalities that increase the complexity of selecting appropriate countermeasures.  
Therefore, Granadillo et al. (2012) introduced an ontology-driven approach to address the 
complexity.  The proposed model considers two main aspects of this field; they are 
information manipulated by the security information and event management 
environments and the operations applied to this information to achieve the desired goals.  
To reach the goal, they used BotNets to illustrate Internet vulnerabilities for a secure 
Internet transaction.  
Network communication systems have flaws that lead to security breaches.  
Morais, Cavalli, and Martins (2011) asserted that network communication systems are 
intrinsically parameter random access memory (PRAM) and the flaws in the network 
communications could lead to security breaches in applications, which a malicious user 
could exploit to cause security failures in the system or could take total control of the 
vulnerable system.  Therefore, they introduced a new attack injection approach based on 
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attack modeling to perform security testing and to detect any potential security 
vulnerabilities.  Morais et al. (2011) used attack trees to describe the system flaws and 
derive similar attack scenarios.  Attack scenarios are refined to executable scripts for 
testing tools that oversee attacks against the system.  They used real attacks such as 
denial of service and cipher suite rollback attacks to the wireless application protocol, 
currently used in the low-tier mobile devices, to support their assertion.  The 
experimental results suggested that the approach could achieve high efficiency in 
uncovering vulnerabilities to reduce security risks. 
Human factor threats have increased mobile device accessibility.  Pefuegnot, 
Laurent, Aurelien, Thibault, Julien, and Louis (2011) highlighted that the mobile 
transactions pose severe threats to e-banking because the end users ignore security 
precautions associated with mobile phones in e-banking, providing hackers a platform to 
launch malicious codes to intercept and hijack the system with even a smart card.   An 
attacker might use a keylogger to capture the amount of the payment displayed in the 
terminal to fool the user or to steal the credential.  Pefuegnot et al. (2011) proposed a 
security mechanism based on the graphical Turning test to prevent mobile transaction 
submissions by the malware.  The graphical Turning test sustained the mobile transaction 
solution and strengthened the security mechanism of entrusted handheld devices.  It also 
underlined a proof of concept to implement and test the feasibility of SIM card to 
determine the mobile phone performances and security level. 
The mobile phone performance and security level are challenges for many 
organizations around the world since 2008.  Wamyil and Mu’azu (2008) explained that 
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the global system for the mobile communication network, knowns as GSM, is a 
worldwide standard for mobile communication such as voice calls, short and multimedia 
messaging services, known as SMS and MMS, and global packet radio service, known as 
GPRS, used for Internet connectivity.  Some of these services have possible security 
vulnerabilities.  Wamyil and Mu’azu (2008) also investigated the security measures used 
in the GSM networks and found that they were inadequate to the current cyber-threats, 
including authentication, encryption, equipment identification and subscriber identity 
confidentiality, as well as the manifestation of network vulnerabilities including SIM, 
SMS, encryption and signaling attacks.  These mobile devices are widely used in many 
developing countries for diverse purposes and could have a major role in information 
system security (ISS) breaches. 
The outcome of ISS breaches differs from damaging database integrity to physical 
destruction of whole information system facilities.  Geric and Hutinski (2011) indicated 
that information systems face different types of security risks, which could originate from 
inside or outside of the facility intentionally or unintentionally.  The security risks could 
cause disruptions in negligible vital segments of information systems or with significant 
interruptions in information systems functionality.  Accurate calculation of losses caused 
by such incidents is difficult due to some small-scale ISS incidents, which might not be 
detected or could be detected after a significant time delay.   
A portion of these incidents results from an under evaluation of ISS risks.  Geric 
and Hutinski (2011) also addressed the different types and criteria for ISS risks 
classification and outlined most common classifications used in literature and practice.  
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They delineated a standard set of criteria that could be used for the ISS threats 
classification, which could be useful to compare and evaluate different security threats 
and could help organizations to manage their ISS risks or threats better. 
The computer security plan assistant (SPA) could manage ISS risks or threats.  
Hunteman, Evans, Brownstein, and Chapman (2009) argued that the industries should use 
the computer SPA, which is an expert system for reviewing Department of Energy (DOE) 
automated data processing (ADP) security plans.  The computer security policies of the 
DOE stipulate to review and update the ADP security plan periodically for all DOE sites.  
The Center for Computer Security at Los Alamos National Laboratory sponsored BDM 
International Inc. to develop SPA using an expert system shell, called XI-Plus.  
Furthermore, the SPA runs on an IBM or compatible personal computer and consists of a 
series of questions about the ADP security plan.  An SPA user answers the questions 
related to information systems based on the ADP security plan.  The SPA end-user 
reviews each section of the security plan in any order until all sections have been 
reviewed.  The SPA user might stop the assessment process after any section and resume 
later.  
A security plan review report is available after the appraisal of each section of the 
security plan.  The security plan review report provides a written assessment of the 
completeness of the ADP security plan to the end user.  The security practitioners then 
test the SPA results at Los Alamos and provide a report on system security posture of 
organizations.  This approach helped in mitigating security risks or threats within 
information systems of organizations. 
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Data Breach and Human Factor Security Framework 
Most organizations lack a cyber-security strategic roadmap for securing their IT 
assets, resulting in constant attacks on information systems and data breaches.  In general, 
these attacks and data breaches are undisclosed, especially in Ivory Coast and other West 
African countries.  Most banks lack the following three overarching strategic goals to 
drive their cyber-security strategy and guide their future direction: (1) Manage and 
control access to applications, information, and data, (2) Protect the infrastructure that 
contains applications, information, and data, and (3) Protect information and data.  The 
dynamics of the cyber-security threat landscape and implications for modern electronic 
transactions have moved away from nuisance and destructive attacks in favor of activities 
motivated by financial, political, and religious gains.  
Moreover, a considerable number of network owners across the globe did not 
require a network license to receive an IP address.  However, the network topography 
across the globe uses a nonunified standard and does not have to obey physical and 
logical network topologies, resulting in poorly designed network topologies and 
unprotected compromised servers.  The expansion of network communications did not 
consider the network architecture layouts of LANs and WANs as well as the advantages 
and disadvantages of each layout and the optimal application.  Nearly every hosting 
provider, who hosts millions of websites, email servers, DNS servers, database servers, 
VOIP gateways, resulted in compromised servers, websites, and applications because 
many of the providers offer little if any deep packet inspection to their customers. 
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A firewall and demilitarized zone do not ensure the full security of the network 
topology.  Most often organizations do not know they have compromised customer data 
in their network.  Firewalls stop screening data in the OSI model at the session, 
presentation, and application layers, where most exploits could occur.  Therefore, cyber-
criminals might use DMZ and firewall failures to stop exploits or other means to commit 
data breaches within an organization.  
Data Breach Process  
The cyber-threat landscape is more dynamic than ever because attackers are 
rapidly adapting to new security measures developed and implemented to protect 
computers systems.  The current security threats identified in the Internet security trend 
reports are: 
• increased professionalism and commercialization of malicious activities; 
• threats that are increasingly tailored for specific regions; 
• increasing numbers of multi-staged attacks; 
• attackers targeting victims through banks exploiting trusted entities; and 
• convergence of attack methods according to the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS), which is the standard used by the Federal 
statistical agencies to collect, analyze, and publish statistical data related to 
the U.S. business economy (NAICS, 2011). 
The old mainframe platforms pose a challenge because the active security tools 
are not available for the old mainframe.  Cyber-criminals continue to automate and 
modernize their techniques toward low-risk attacks against weaker targets.  Hacking 
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incidents and malware attacks have increased together with an increase in the 
involvement of the activist groups in data breaches.  Furthermore, information systems 
attacks happened at the general support system, where 94% of the compromised data 
involving servers were up from 18% (NAICS, 2011).  These threats remain the preferred 
tools used by the external agents to commit most information systems attacks and data 
breaches.   
Many attacks continue to manipulate the authentication process using the stolen 
or guessed credentials and access information systems.  The globalization of network 
communications is a primary challenge to identify locations of cyber-threats agents 
because most breaches do not require the physical presence of attackers.  The following 
three categories of cyber-threats exist: 
• External threats: They originate external to the organization and the network 
of partners, for example, former employees, lone hackers, organized criminal 
groups, and government entities.  They also include environmental events 
such as floods, earthquakes, and power disruptions.  Typically, external 
entities are not trusted or privileged. 
• Internal threats: They come from within the organization, for example, 
executives, employees, independent contractors, interns, as well as internal 
infrastructure.  Insiders are trusted and privileged, and the level of trust and 
privilege vary among individuals. 
• Partner threats: They include any third party sharing a business relationship 
with an organization, for instance, suppliers, vendors, hosting providers, and 
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outsourced IT support.  Some level of trust and privilege are implied between 
business partners (NAICS, 2014). 
The involvement of external agents is a major threat and occurs mainly with the 
assistance of the insider agents in many cases, for instance, the Equifax data breach in 
2017.  The motive of outsider threat agents is variant and outsider attacks remain at the 
peak within information systems attacks and data breaches, specifically in the financial 
industry.  
A resurgence of hacktivism activities against the financial industry is increasing 
with the concept changing from the cult of dead cow in the late 19th century of website 
defacements to coordinated denial of service attacks and other jaunts to express 
disagreement or obtain bragging rights to review.  The activist groups add data breaches 
to their repertoire with a heightened intensity and publicity.  Similarly, data breaches with 
money-driven motive continue to focus on opportunistic attacks against weaker targets.  
Attackers steal smaller hauls of data from a large number of smaller organizations 
presenting a lower risk to attackers.  In contrast, the activist groups could use some of the 
most dangerous attack vectors, such as drive-by attacks, targeted attacks, consumer 
attacks, metasploit attacks, internal attacks, Botnet attacks, and scripted attacks. 
Objectives of Cyber-Attacks 
There are many motivations for cyber-attacks.  Internet security threat reports 
revealed that attackers use various techniques to avoid detection and prolong their 
presence in the system to steal information, hijack the computer for marketing purposes, 
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provide remote access, or otherwise compromise confidential information for profit 
(NAICS, 2014).  Common cyber-crimes include: 
• theft of credit card and other financial data 
• theft of personal information, that is, identity theft 
• extortion motivated by a threatened information disclosure 
• extortion based on threatened denial of service 
• alteration of data on web pages or other trusted sources  
• economic gain, retribution, or political purposes 
• exploitation of operating systems for a remote control for denial of service 
• exploitation of operating systems for remote control of spyware installation 
• commercially-motivated information theft 
• theft of defense secrets for the national interest 
Vectors of Cyber-Attacks 
Majority of the vulnerabilities are related to the web applications and other 
avenues of attacks include: 
• Software bugs and software with an inadequate patch or poor configuration 
such as passwords and unnecessary services could lead to the following 
attacks: simple remote exploit, worms, external remote-control software 
(bots), rootkits, spyware, keystroke loggers, and information disclosure such 
as network or configuration details; 
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• Flawed protocols and weak network architectures could allow the following 
attacks to succeed: man-in-the-middle attacks, snooping/sniffing, and session 
hijacking; 
• Curiosity, carelessness, and even the desire to be helpful proliferates these 
attacks: social engineering, phishing or spear phishing, viruses, IM messages 
with attachments or hyperlinks to an infected site, email messages with 
attachments or hyperlinks to an infected site, and password disclosure; 
• Improper physical security practices, lack of proper inventory controls, and 
lax data destruction practices lead to the theft of computer systems, drives, 
laptops, PDAs, cell phones and smartphones; the loss of tapes, disks, USB 
keys and devices with sensitive data; and the leak of confidential information 
on machines/drives that are donated or resold to dumpster divers; and 
• Failure to address the backup and recovery issues as well as business 
continuity planning lead to loss of critical data, extended service interruptions, 
loss of revenue and reputation, and failure to meet service level agreements 
and financial penalties. 
Sources of Cyber-Attacks 
Attackers are increasingly sophisticated and organized, and they have begun to 
adopt practices that are like traditional software development and business practices.  
Alarmingly, the global decentralized networks of collaborative malicious activity 
(BotNets) have become so pervasive that they are rented or sold as commodities in the 
Internet underground economy.  Another indication of the commercialization of 
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malicious activity is the emergence of phishing toolkits, which are a set of scripts that 
allow an attacker to set up phishing websites automatically to imitate the legitimate 
websites of various companies and to generate corresponding phishing email messages.  
One significant sign of a phishing toolkit is the hosting of numerous phishing websites on 
a single IP address (NAICS, 2014) and the use of phishing kits is increasing rapidly on a 
wide-spread level.  
The phishing toolkits utilize the BotNets to target unsuspecting customers.  The financial 
industry faces severe challenges combating these BotNets, which use numerous attempts 
to defraud the electronic payment system to steal several millions of dollars from victims 
(NAICS, 2014).  Other prevalent cyber-attackers include amateur and professional 
computer hackers, organized crime gangs, professional and non-state sponsored actors 
such as terrorists and political activists), rival corporations, nation-states seeking 
competitive advantage, angry and unethical employees, contractors and consultants, 
outsourced or subcontracted employees and firms, and software and hardware vendors 
looking for financial benefits (NAICS, 2014).  These cyber-attackers may use multiple 
techniques of sources attacks, which are diverse and focus primary on easy targets. 
Targets of Cyber-Attacks 
Internet security trends have identified increased attacks aimed at client-side 
applications and increased use of evasive tactics to avoid detection.  Additionally, large 
widespread Internet worms have helped smaller more targeted attacks focusing on fraud, 
data theft, and other criminal activities.  Although software vendors and enterprises try to 
adapt to the changing threat environment by implementing security best practices, 
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attackers have begun to adopt new techniques such as targeting malicious code in client-
side applications.  Commonly targeted applications include web browsers, email clients, 
and other desktop applications (NAICS, 2014).  However, cyber-attacks targets vary and 
include Internet applications, Intranet applications, database servers, web servers, mail 
servers, DNS servers, wireless networks, desktops, laptops, PDAs, routers, switches, 
appliances (e.g., smart printers), PBXs and telephony infrastructure, network devices, 
VPNs, flash media, cell phones and smartphones, and IDS/IPS equipment. 
Networks Threats 
With well-equipped tools, a hacker could primarily do an investigative work to 
identify a target host within a network to discover any weaknesses it might have.  The 
network scan could help to locate the hosts and ports together with the identification of 
possible victims.  Internet registration bodies and DNS servers could provide information 
about the networks because domain names and IP address mapping are simple to access 
by hackers.  
Hackers could find the network information from a router that uses SNMP for 
management purposes, especially, if the router has the default public community string 
enabled.  Hackers could utilize whois, which a UNIX-based command from Internet 
registration sites and the lookup command from the Windows command line to display 
lists of registered IP addresses, domain names, and possible connections.  Alternatively, 
they could use the traceroute command to identify the intermediate networks in a path to 
a host.  Importantly, less sophisticated hackers could access information when a network 
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administrator leaves the DNS information in the public domain because the DNS has a 
distributed database that records types of equipment and operating system used.  
After the identification of the network components, hackers could identify the 
individual machines connected to the network via war-dialing, which is a program that 
calls a given list or range of phone numbers and records.  Those that answer with the 
handshake tones are possible entry points to computer or telecommunications systems.  
Due to these activities, the financial institutions and other organizations should 
assure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information and information 
systems.  Perhaps, the most significant example of a nation-state sponsored BotNet attack 
is the cyber-attacks launched by the Russian hackers against Estonia.  The Russian 
hackers launched the cyber-attack as a retaliation to the defacement of a statue of Lenin 
in Estonia, which knocked the entire country off the Internet. 
Web-based Malicious Activity 
The 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report indicated that malware was 
responsible for over one-third of data breach cases investigated.  The malware was the 
cause of 40% of data breaches, resulting in 90% of total compromised records (Verizon, 
2013).  Malicious codes have evolved to reflect the recent emphasis on web-based attacks 
and led to the following issues: 
• The emergence of malicious code altered web pages on compromised 
computers. 
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• The malicious modified code on the compromised computer redirected the 
browser to malicious websites that could further compromise the user’s 
computer. 
• PIN information associated with consumer payment card accounts was 
increasingly targeted in 2012.  Personally identifiable information (PII) was 
the second most-compromised data type. 674 instances of massive data 
breaches were recorded by late 2012. 
• Data of 45 million people were exposed. 
• More than $56 billion worth of ID theft occurred since 2005. 
• 94 million credit cards worth of $450M were lost as of mid-2012. 
• In addition to theft-sensitive government information, personal privacy and 
business secrets are compromised as well (Verizon, 2013).   
Today, criminals are frequently attacking business websites due to the availability 
of new technologies.  
Criminal Website Attacks 
Because data breaches occur through network communication, understanding the 
usefulness of attack path in the network and the vulnerability score are essential in 
securing the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data or information.  The 
vulnerability score is provided on a 10-point scale and is computed based on the technical 
report on the common vulnerability scoring system version 2.0.  Mell, Scarfone, and 
Romanosky (2007) asserted that the probabilities of attacking the WU-FTPD and 
PoFTPD are 0.8 and 0.2, respectively.  Mell, Scarfone, and Romanosky indicated that the 
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probability of attacking the WuFTPD is more than that of the ProFTPD because the 
WuFTPD access is that of an authenticated user.  A vulnerability score of 7.0 or more is 
categorized as critical.  Additionally, attacking the ProFTPD from WuFTPD has a higher 
probability compared to the direct attack.   
The assigned probabilities are log-normalized followed by the multiplication by a 
factor of 10.  This approach was verified using the Dijkstra single source shortest path 
algorithm, resulting in the same attack path as discovered by the proposed methodology.  
Ammann et al. (2005) proposed the following attack path: Attacker → WuFTPD → 
ProFTPD.  Therefore, many security practitioners have assumed that a vulnerability score 
of 7.0 or more could provide a root level access to the attacker on both the WuFTPd and 
the ProFTPD.  Similarly, the access level between the WuFTPD and the ProFTPD gets 
upgraded to the root from authenticated access, providing information on the paths that 
the hacker took to compromise the business information. 
The following two attack paths are available for a hacker to choose: (1) Attacker 
→ WuFTPD → ProFTPD and (2) Attacker → ProFTPD.  In both processes, a hacker 
uses an algorithm to confirm the access type level.  Thus, the security practitioners 
consider the path identification holistically as one method to stop a network cyber-attack 
(Ammann et al., 2005).  The goal is to reduce the risk and secure the network after the 
path identification.  Understanding this concept could assist to mitigate the risks and 
avoid the security vulnerabilities on a node on the attack path.  Thus, the path 
identification is not an isolated process and has to work with the risk mitigation and 
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human errors and factors.  The iterative result process could lead to overall improvement 
of security of the network.   
Attack graph provides a holistic analysis of the system security against the 
objective of an attacker and is useful for proactive identification of possible risk 
management measures.  Furthermore, the graph also addresses the issue of the cyclic 
dependencies and proposes the detection and removal of probable network flaws.  The 
generated attack paths are used to represent the assault target network security conditions.   
The Boolean logic minimizer helps to identify the minimum possible automated 
network security options and to find the possible attack niche in the polynomial time 
complexity, known as the host network of attack surface measures.  The Boolean 
methodology can be adapted for active human factors risk mitigation in an organizational 
network based on the theoretical models and practical technologies.  However, the 
increase in wireless technology has resulted in the multi-stage threats in such networks.  
The consideration of wireless threat analysis in networks is due to the growing research 
interest in wireless financial e-transaction and electronic authentication.  Criminal attacks 
use different electronic agents to commit data breach.  The findings from the 18 
organizations showed that their data breach was caused by a malicious insider or an 
outside hacker (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2013).   
Employee Negligence in Data Breaches 
In many organizations, data breaches occur due to the negligence of employees or 
internal policies regarding malicious codes.  Ponemon Institute LLC (2013) found that 
the main cause of a data breach for 51 organizations was the employee or contractor 
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negligence accounting for 49% of incidents followed by 37% for a malicious or criminal 
attack, and 23% for system glitches including a combination of IT and business process 
failures.  Mitigation of such growing security concern depends on managers 
implementing measures to tackle internal human factors threats. 
Access to Applications, Information, and Data 
Cyber-security threats to network communications have increased because of the 
rapid increase in interdependency of computer systems.  As a result, challenges to banks 
and other organizations are to provide an efficient, secure, and documented access to 
their information systems at all levels, from internal employees and contractors to 
external partners and customers.  Most banks and other organizations do not provide the 
technology to allow their system administrators to act in real-time.  Similarly, they do not 
enforce access to computer systems across highly complex and growing financial 
industry network environment.  
Banks and other organizations cannot create, modify, and delete user accounts, 
user profiles, and corporate policies as well as the correlation of data from human 
resources, financial, travel, procurement, and email systems.  Additionally, banks and 
other companies face web-based threats such as malware, which is analogs to cyber-
vandalism and generally spreads through trojans, rootkits or backdoors keystroke loggers 
ransomware (KPMG, 2013).  Growing and sophisticated malware increase the 
complexity of emerging security threats landscape.  
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New Threats to Security Landscape 
Emerging Technologies 
Cloud computing offers scalable and virtual resources as a service over the 
Internet.  Cloud refers to the Internet infrastructure as a service.  Because most cloud 
computing services are not regulatory compliant, business entities are responsible for 
preventing regulatory data from residing in the cloud.  Furthermore, services are not 
customizable to organizational security standard because there is no one size fits all lines 
of attack and organizations must adhere to service provider technology standards.  The 
pros and cons of cloud computer system are given in Table 1.  Segregation of data is not 
segmented physically, and many customers data are segmented via the use of VLANs. 
Table 1  
Cloud Computer Strength and Weakness Analysis 
Pros Cons 
Fast start-up 
Scalability 
Business agility 
Faster product development 
No capital expenditure 
Bandwidth considerations 
Application performance 
Data security 
Economies of scale 
Adoption 
Interoperability 
    
Mandatory Security Controls and e-Financial Transactions 
The FISMA (2014) states that the agency program officials should conduct the 
annual enterprise continuous monitoring (eCM) security controls assessments to mitigate 
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system security breaches and should have mandatory security controls.  Mandatory 
security controls are assessed in conjunction with one-third baseline for security controls 
based on the FISMA year of systems (e.g., year 1, 2, or 3).  The NIST (2013) suggests 
that mandatory security controls are the most volatile, that is, most affected by ongoing 
changes to the information system or environment of operation.  Additionally, they are 
most critical to protect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 
organizations, and Nation, resulting in frequent testing using an approved organizational 
risk assessment method.  This process could assist the agency to implement a more 
disciplined and structured approach to managing, controlling, and documenting changes 
to an information system or environment.  
The annual testing of mandatory security controls could minimize or eliminate the 
potential threats or vulnerabilities associated with systems.  Mandatory security controls 
are reviewed and adjusted to address current threats at the beginning of each FISMA 
year, July 1.  These controls are tested at every eCM annual assessment unless the control 
could fit at least one of the following criteria: 
• Control is a risk-based decision during a previous cyber-security assessment 
and is re-validated to ensure risk-based decision status. 
• Control is a known open risk against a system, that is, an open plan of action 
and milestones (POA&M) weakness. 
• Any control with a known vulnerability as long as the weakness is still open. 
During the annual system security control assessment, a list of mandatory controls 
to be tested for each eCM annual assessment is provided to the owner of the system or 
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application.  The following eleven mandatory controls in seven control groups exist, 
namely access, audit and accountability, configuration management, planning, 
identification and authentication, systems and communications protection, and system 
information integrity.  These controls represent operational, technical, and management 
controls presented in NIST SP 800-53 r4. 
Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment 
The NIST (2013) recommendations stressed that industries could scan for 
vulnerabilities among tools and automated parts of the vulnerability management process 
to detect software flaws and improper system configurations.  Vulnerability analysis 
measures the vulnerability impact of systems or hosted applications and is done at least 
monthly for all systems and upon the identification of new vulnerabilities by following 
the steps outlined below:  
• Analyze vulnerability scan reports and results from security control 
assessments.  
• Remediate legitimate vulnerabilities by risk assessment. 
• Share information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and 
security control assessments with designated persons within the organization 
to eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other information systems (i.e., systemic 
weaknesses or deficiencies).  
• Allow for possible false positives in a scan report and vulnerabilities that have 
been determined to be an acceptable risk.  
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Vulnerability scanning tools should have the capability to readily update the list 
of information system vulnerabilities identified through the scan at least biannually or 
upon the identification of new vulnerabilities.  Vulnerability scanning procedures should 
demonstrate the breadth and depth of coverage with information system components 
scanned and vulnerabilities checked.  Some financial industries and other organizations 
should discern information that is discoverable by adversaries.  Automated mechanisms 
should detect the presence of unauthorized software in information systems and notify 
designated officials to mitigate system vulnerabilities.  Vulnerability analysis and 
assessment should address any system weaknesses through the POA&M process, which 
is a key document in security authorization package and is subject to federal reporting 
requirements established by the Office of Management and Budget.  The POA&Ms 
updates are based on the findings from security control assessments, security impact 
analyses, and continuous monitoring activities.  Therefore, the NIST recommends to 
maintain and document information systems by developing, implementing, and managing 
a process for ensuring the security of POA&M weaknesses.   
The vulnerability analysis and assessment could remedy information security 
actions to mitigate risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 
organizations, and the Nation.  Furthermore, NIST (2013) outlined concepts related to 
minimum information security risk and helped companies to define, monitor, and report 
on information security performance, which is an outcome-based metrics to measure or 
evaluate the effectiveness or efficiency of information security program and the security 
controls employed to conduct the day-to-day operation.  Some companies should 
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disseminate, and periodically review and update a business impact analysis to analyze the 
loss or degradation of each asset including customer information.  The review could 
impact business functions of organizations and determine the time, at which the critical 
operations could be affected.  For this reason, companies should know their recovery 
time objective (RTO).  
To effectively apply RTO, companies may analyze the consequences of the loss 
or degradation of each asset and establish the necessary recovery time frames.  The 
maximum RTO for a critical asset should be specified when full functions of the system 
could be back online before significant impacts are felt.  The system RTO should be 
consistent across the time that it would take to impact national security, homeland 
security, economic stability, and health and welfare of the American people (NIST, 
2013).  The RTO approach helps managers to determine the period that a company could 
stay off the network without having business operations. 
Cyber-Security Operations Roadmap Challenges 
Many organization clientele services rely on the seamless interconnectivity of 
internal and external systems to deliver mission-critical applications via an electronic 
storefront of Internet-based services to customers and partners as well as Intranet-based 
services to employees.  Meanwhile, the nature of cyber-threats to Internet-based business 
transactions has been changing rapidly.  Some financial institutions and other industries 
have difficulties in protecting sensitive personally identifiable information regardless of 
whether it is created, distributed, or stored and whether it is typed, electronic, 
handwritten, printed, filmed, computer-generated, or spoken. 
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Threats to information and information systems have risen dramatically and many 
information and information systems in financial institutions and other industries do not 
have adequate protection from criminal, insider, or self-inflicted accidental (human 
factors) events that could weaken their security and degrade public trust and confidence.  
Intruders could disrupt the operation of information systems of banks.  Most financial 
institutions and other organizations information systems do not take preventative, 
detective, and corrective measures to reduce vulnerabilities to cyber-threats before they 
could be exploited.   
Despite the reality of such threats and potentially catastrophic results, many 
financial institutions face challenges to protect information and information systems from 
criminal, insider or self-inflicted accidental events weakening the security.  Though many 
banks and other organizations have progressed to a certain extent in protecting customer 
accounts and information, they have not leveraged the technology to full capacity to 
modernize account activities due to the rapid growth of cyber-criminals and emerging 
transcontinental cyber-threats (Berghel, 2011).  Many customers still have confidence in 
banks and maintaining this confidence is vital for the survival of the financial industry 
and other organizations.  
Time Span of Breach  
The timeline of events leading up to and following a data breach varies 
considerably.  Pre-attack phase could provide some information about target acquisition, 
reconnaissance techniques used, and warning signs existed before the attack.  In 2013, 
investigators found at least some indication of pre-attack phase or research involvement.  
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Intruders explored network and systems of victims until they found a desired point of 
attack.  Criminals could access data in a matter of minutes or hours most of the time the 
compromise is undiscovered or uncontained for weeks or months in the majority of the 
cases.  Overall, some organizations discovered breaches slightly quicker in 2013, though 
it was not quick enough to contain damages (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2013).  Many 
organizations contain the damage by stopping the bleeding and do not refer to complete 
remediation of root problems.  
Once a breach is contained, organizations remove unauthorized access and 
exposure of information; however, the majority of the breaches require weeks or more to 
control and only a few could be contained in less than a couple of days.  Nevertheless, it 
could take a prolonged period if disaster recovery preparedness plan of organization is 
inadequate.  Consequently, many organizations could not respond when a crisis occurs.  
Data breaches suggest that the utilization of detective controls among breach victims is 
relatively low: 
• Some large organizations did not have intrusion detection systems. 
• Others had deployed IDS; but, it has not activated them. 
• Monitoring network activity with IDS, though not in locations or assets 
involved in the breach. 
• Some organizations do not have prescriptive compliance requirements for 
event detection. 
In addition to low detective capability, most organizations are not equipped to 
respond adequately to breaches when they are discovered, with only 38% of victims had 
77 
 
an incident response plan.  Investigators found signs of anti-forensics in over one-third of 
cases in 2013 because companies did not want to tarnish their reputation and removed 
evidence of criminal actions to manipulate post-incident investigations (Ponemon 
Institute LLC, 2013).  This attitude underlined the behavior of some organizations when 
dealing with human factors threats. 
This approach also highlighted the attitudes of companies toward monitoring and 
testing networks: 
• Tracked and monitored access to network resources and cardholder data (9% 
compliant). 
• Recurrently tested security systems and processes (17% compliant). 
• Kept a policy that tackled information security (17% compliant). 
The situation is prominent in the financial industry and other organizations with an online 
card payment system due to the risk of non-compliance (Verizon, 2013).  Hackers also 
use anti-forensics measures with data wiping, data hiding, and data corruption.   
Secure Trusted Information and Information Systems 
Secure and trusted information and information systems are vital to financial 
modernization in the global economic system.  Many bank customers, trading partners, 
and other organizations rely on trusted information to achieve key personal and mission 
objectives.  Each phase of financial industry business processes is dependent on the 
availability of reliable and uncompromised information, information systems, and 
business processes.  Therefore, availability of a secure information environment is 
essential in the context of increasing attacks on information systems and must be a 
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critical component in the modernization of technology by organizations to reflect 
changing customer account activities in the global economy.  A secure and trusted 
information path is important for clienteles to access information with confidence in 
integrity.   
However, network communications have vulnerabilities with computer operating 
systems.  In general, many companies do not update security patches that Microsoft or 
Apple releases on a daily or weekly basis.  Consequently, cyber-criminals use flaws in 
the software and computer operating system vulnerabilities to attack the integrity, 
availability, and confidentiality of information systems.  
Electronic Authentication of Financial Transactions 
An electronic transaction policy should form the basis to determine the 
authenticity of the electronic transfer of financial information to mitigate frauds.  
However, the authentication should not be standardized across the financial industry 
because it could make it easier for hackers to exploit every system.  The digital signature 
key is particularity to secure customer e-transaction authenticity and requires public key 
digital signatures of each bank for financial transactions.  Therefore, financial institutions 
should implement a certificate public cryptographic key to provide proof that an 
authenticated person has made the transaction.  Financial electronic transactions policy 
should address e-authentications of clientele with bridge certification.   
However, financial e-authentication should be agile to adjust quickly to changing 
financial threats as mandated by the Federal information processing standards stipulated 
by the NIST.  The banking industry is the pioneer to develop policies and best practices 
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for e-authentication, including the development of methods based on public certificates 
and other cryptographic credentials, to secure payment, collection, and collateral 
transactions.  As a result, certification authority of banks could have to work under the 
authority of Treasury root certification authority, which could issue a single certificate 
validating authorized agent of the bank and the status of the bank as a designated agent of 
Treasury.  
The individual bank should have the authority to issue certificates to end users.  
Moreover, the governments and financial industry could allow banks to have their 
cryptographic credentials, which could ensure financial e-transactions security and 
minimize e-transaction frauds.  Therefore, governments and the financial industry should 
coordinate strategies to combat e-transaction frauds to achieve security equilibrium.   
Compliance to Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard  
The payment card industry data security underline the following threats related to 
the compliance deficiency in financial institutions and other organizations: guarded 
cardholder data, stored data (11% compliant), encrypted transmission of cardholder data 
and sensitive information across public networks (68% compliant), upheld a vulnerability 
management program, used and regularly updated security patched (62% compliant), 
developed and maintained secure systems and applications (5% compliant), implemented 
strong access control measures, confined access to data on bona fide need to know (24% 
compliant), assigned a unique ID to each person with computer access (19% compliant), 
limited physical access to cardholder data (43% compliant), frequently monitored and 
tested networks, tracked and monitored all access to network resources and cardholder 
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data (5% compliant), recurrently tested security systems and processes (14% compliant), 
preserved an information security policy, and kept a policy that tackled information 
security (14% compliant) (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2013).  Among them, protecting 
stored data, developing and maintaining secure systems, and applications tracking and 
monitoring access to network resources and cardholder data are the most important 
because they are responsible for several major breaches over the past five years.  Many 
researchers indicated that protecting against data breaches and controlling internal threat 
sources are major challenges in the context of ever-changing network communications in 
global political dominant leadership and competitive market economy.  Because 
protecting against data breaches in Ivory Coast has not been investigated in detail, the 
purpose of this study was to contribute knowledge to this gap based on information 
collected from professionals on the protection of information and prevention of data 
breaches.   
Summary and Conclusions 
Many financial institutions and business environments continue to evolve with 
growing network communications across the globe.  The clientele of the financial 
industry has switched predominantly to an online money transfer system to pay their bills 
or make international payments.  Also, customers are using telex transfers (TT), through 
which they transfer money, make payments, or purchase merchandises to secure 
interbank transactions.  However, financial e-transaction environment has created new 
types of financial frauds such as identity fraud and e-transaction flaws.  To mitigate 
financial e-transactions irregularities, countries such as the U.S. have promoted generally 
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accepted accounting principles, which is the financial accounting standards for fraud 
prevention.  Tracking of financial e-transaction is possible with the financial interbank 
communications through the bank identifier code, providing the financial e-transaction 
security system to reduce frauds.  However, the effectiveness of tracking financial e-
transactions is still a challenge in the global market economy because countries, 
organizations, and banking systems do not have the same information security capability.  
Consequently, the banking industry and many organizations, including governments, 
should build a uniform security information, security environment, policies, and laws 
across the globe to protect their systems and customers.  Therefore, I will discuss in 
Chapter 3 about the research methods and challenges to data breach to understand how 
data breaches and internal human factor threats could be overcome so that top managers 
could control data breaches and internal human factors effectively. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Many organizations in Ivory Coast and other African countries have significant 
deficiencies in information systems security controls, resulting in pervasive 
vulnerabilities, undetected breaches, unknown amounts of damages, and numerous thefts.  
These deficiencies could increase the risks of deliberate misuse and unauthorized 
exposure of Ivory Coast information system assets.  The focus of this study was to 
investigate significant data breach challenges faced by the Ivory Coast citizens and the 
role that executives or managers could play to minimize cyber-security threats.  
Research Design and Rationale 
I chose the research design for this study based on contextual features and 
research problems.  The following three research questions investigated in this study 
were: 
RQ1: What are the internal human factors that contribute to data breaches and 
compromised information in Ivory Coast emerging business environments?  
RQ2: What are the root causes of the internal human factors that contribute to 
data breaches and compromised information in Ivory Coast businesses?  
RQ3: What preventative measures could managers use to minimize the threat 
from human factors, which are related to an internal employee, that contribute to data 
breaches or compromised information? 
Therefore, I used a qualitative research methodology involving a survey 
consisting of 20 questions.  Furthermore, I used a design that involves intense 
examination of a small number of entities without varying independent variables or 
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controlling confounding variables.  In addition to the surveys, I utilized open-ended 
questionnaires, coded interviews, and systematic observation for data collection (see 
Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004).  Since this was a qualitative study, I used open-ended 
questions to obtain the feelings of the participants and probed their understanding through 
additional questions depending on their responses.  The qualitative research paradigm 
focuses on the process rather than the product or outcomes (Merriam, 1988) and 
emphasizes individual experience and descriptions of life situations.  Therefore, I sought 
to explore the life experiences of the individual participants, particularly what they 
understood about the impact of human factors on data breaches and the ways to mitigate 
them.  
In most cases, the data breach events were accidental, while they were intentional 
in many other cases.  However, data is valuable regardless of whether the breach is 
accidental or criminal and the media reported numerous high-profile examples of the data 
loss.  A compilation of a few cases is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2  
Examples of Data Loss  
Company name Year Compromised records 
Sun Trust 2018 1.5 million 
Equifax  2017 140 million 
Home Depot 2015 94 million 
Sony Corporation 2011 77 million 
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The results of data loss could lead to brand damage, damage to shareholder faith, 
legal fees, class action lawsuits, public relations costs, regulatory fines, victim 
notification for state disclosure laws, credit monitoring services, free goods and services 
to retain customers, service downtime, breach investigations, lost customers, and lost 
revenue.  Furthermore, most data resided in data centers, where data loss occurs due to a 
lack of security controls on servers, storage, content, and networks.  Further, data centers 
have been going through a generational change over the last few years with 
consolidation, virtualization, and the use of cloud services.  Data loss could continue to 
increase if the security of data centers is not factored in, preferably at the design and 
architecture phase of construction, in the context of the increased complexity of the next-
generation data centers coupled with the massive amount of data they store and process.   
Thus, I used seven steps in the research design process: 
1. Acceptance: Do I have a goal that determines the design process?  
2. Analysis: Do I have themes related to the design problem? 
3. Definition: Do I define the problem and steps related to the planning of the 
work? 
4. Ideation: Do the research questions inquire sensual experiences and feelings 
of the participants’? 
5. Idea Selection: Are the themes specifically related to the research problem? 
6. Implementation: Will I be able to recommend that will contribute to social 
changes? 
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7. Evaluation: Will I be able to objectively critique the proposed process and 
findings?  
Role of the Researcher 
The role of a researcher in this study was as a participant observer, interviewer, 
data collector, and analyzer.  I purposely selected 27 participants for this study, consisting 
of five Ivorian government officials, four financial executives, five chief information 
officers, six IT managers, and seven information systems technicians who had at least 3 
years of experience in their positions.  This study addressed the significance of 
dysfunctional managerial processes and their impacts on leaders’ decisions about 
overcoming data breaches and human factors related to information systems.  The group 
did not receive any training in this study and completed the survey, questionnaire, and 
open-ended interview questions to provide robust data for analysis.  I used the snowball 
sampling technique for selecting the participants by asking a participant to choose the 
next one from the list of pseudonyms.  Ultimately, the role was to probe the participants 
and then listen to and process their responses before asking more probing questions to get 
a detailed understanding.   
Methodology 
Measurement is critical in cyber-security as well as quantitative research to ensure 
the trustworthiness of the system or the results of the study.  Therefore, I used the 
validation decision tree proposed by Straub et al. (2004) to prioritize incident report 
assessment as opposed to other validation approaches such as internal validity and 
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statistical conclusion validity.  After verifying the numbers, I conducted a trend analysis 
to correct and validate data.   
When conducting the data analysis, I ensured that the date of the data breach 
incident was reported to CSIRC-CI aligned with the month and year associated with the 
incident.  An incident could involve one asset or multiple assets.  For the latter, I included 
all assets when determining the volume of assets for the compromised data risk 
assessment; however, I included incident only once when determining the volume of 
incidents based on incident type, location, and a related company.  Thus, when deciding 
appropriate data analysis techniques, I also used the decision tree concept proposed by 
Hair (1995), leading to reduced bias and correct decision during data analysis. 
Assumptions  
Many security practitioners and scholars have made several assumptions related 
to the theories for protecting data and mitigating data breaches within information 
systems.  The researchers at the ITL, NIST developed test methods, reference data, proof 
of concept implementations, and technical analyses to safeguard data and advance the 
productive use of IT (NIST, 2012).  The NIST special publication series reports have 
highlighted the ITL research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in ISS as well 
as collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.  Some 
scholars have argued that attack trees are used successfully to identify threats and risks to 
the system, while protection trees are used in conjunction with attack trees to evaluate 
trade-offs in the risk mitigation process (Edge et al., 2007).  While the focus of attack and 
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protection trees is generally on the determination of the overall system risk, the 
methodology is applicable equally to the human factors threat domain.   
Attack trees formally represented all attack vectors and helped to determine the 
events that might occur for attacks to be successful.  Calculation of metrics, such as the 
impact to a system if an action is accomplished, requires the determination of risk 
level for each node (Edge et al., 2007).  Others have used textual clustering and data 
mining theories, which used probabilistic latent semantic indexing to generate links 
among documents, topics of interest, and people.  From these links, an interest profile for 
an individual could be generated (Okolica, Peterson, & Mills, 2008).  Therefore, these 
assumptions emphasize that an organization needs to protect data because cyber-
incidents could have a significant impact on data breaches.  
Cyber-Incidents in Cyber-Attacks 
Data analysis was based on the following coding of incidents reported in the  
electronic tracking (e-trak) database: 
• Disclosure (Disc): Information is revealed to an unauthorized individual. 
• Loss: An asset is found in the undesired location or cannot be located. 
• Theft: An asset is thought or known to have been taken without permission 
from the responsible person.  
I adopted the above codes to organize the reported incidents into three-dimensional data 
to ask a consistent and specific set of questions of all data. 
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Participant Selection 
Twenty-seven participants in this study represented the sample population of 
government officials, financial executives, IT managers, and information systems 
technicians who had at least 3 years of experience in their position and actively used 
computer systems in their work environment.  These requirements were necessary to 
ensure that the participants reflected the minimum skills necessary to secure computer 
systems.  The requirements also ensured that the participants had a detailed 
understanding of information assets and their protection.   
Additionally, the possibility of conducting appropriate statistical analyses was 
another factor considered during the participant selection.  Consequently, I provided the 
participants with information to ensure that they understand social and ethical issues to 
enable them to form opinions and attitudes.  I ensured that each member of the group 
understood the basic concepts involved in the study.  In this process, I provided the 
groups with a series of questions written on cards to address and discuss, which allowed 
me to reduce any bias in data compilation.  I then checked whether the groups were 
comfortable with audio recording and found that two-thirds of participants were not.  
Consequently, I took notes and shared them with respective participants for concurrence.  
Additionally, I developed a questionnaire to capture their incident reports in five West 
African countries.   
Instrumentation 
I used an e-trak database to control and track data breach incidents involving 
disclosures, losses, and thefts reported through CSIRC-CI.   For each incident reported, 
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the database contained information on the type of incident, asset(s), types of PII/SBU, 
risk assessment code, the location of the incident, relevant dates, and the number of 
impacted individuals and businesses.  I reviewed incidents for accuracy by checking the 
consistency between the key facts narrative and type of incident, type of asset, and 
location of the incident.  I also reviewed incident notes and the origination for cases with 
conflicts and made the required corrections on the database.  After validating the extract 
from the CIS report, I matched data against the dashboard reports from e-trak to verify 
the accuracy of the number of incidents.  This process allowed me to check and include 
background information on reporting, risk assessment, and notification processes for 
incidents reported to CSIRC-CI.  I did so to ascertain if there were no significant changes 
to the processes outlined in the previous trend analysis report.   
ABC bank employees reported incidents involving disclosure of PII or loss or 
theft of IT assets.  After I received the incident reports, I entered the information into 
incident management by utilizing e-trak database system to track and manage them 
throughout incident management process, including the risk assessment determination, 
reporting, and to allow potentially impacted individuals to be notified, if necessary.  
Thus, to validate the findings, I used the 2012 data loss barometer (KPMG, 2012) and the 
2013 Internet security threat report (Symantec, 2013). 
 The KPMG report exposed some of the latest trends and statistics for lost and 
stolen information in 2012 across the world as well as the trends over the last five years.  
Over 82 countries are represented in 2012, whereas over 96 countries are represented 
over the last five years.  The report revealed data loss incidents and respective locations.  
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Data loss incidents increased by 40% since 2011 with hacking being the primary cause 
accounting for 60%.  Internal threats reduced significantly, whereas external threats 
doubled.  The worst performing sectors in terms of the total number of incidents were 
technology, financial services, retail, and media over the last five years.  Over the past 
five years, over one billion people have been affected by data loss incidents around the 
world with publicly disclosed incidents increased by 40% in the last two years.   
Data loss incidents in financial services reduced by 80% in the last five years, 
although they were still the fifth worst performing sector in the first half of 2012.  From 
2008 through 2012, KPMG (2012) reported that hackers accessed 681 million records, 
which could increase with growing connectivity.  The majority (88 %) of reported data 
breaches were due to attacks by outsiders.  However, the insider threat still remains high 
in the form of lost laptops, misplaced memory sticks, deliberate or accidental data theft 
by employees.  For example, the U.K. Information Commissioner fined and prosecuted 
more businesses because of insider mistakes than outsider attacks.  Most SMBs should be 
vigilant about their internal employees and anonymous hackers alike. 
The highest number of identities were stolen in January 2012 due to a single 
breach involving over 24 million identities, whereas the numbers mostly fluctuated 
between one and 12 million stolen identities per month for the rest of the year.  The 
average number of monthly breaches for the first half of the year was 10.7 million, which 
increased to 15.4 million in the second half of the year, resulting in a 44% increase 
(Symantec, 2013).  The level of data breach demonstrates the growth of human factor 
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threats and their consequences on organizations if managers did not take proper measures 
to mitigate threats.   
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
The purposely selected samples included five Ivorian government officials, four 
financial executives, five chief information officers (CIO), six IT managers, and seven 
information systems technicians.  I used three data collection approaches such as survey, 
questionnaires, and interviews, which were investigated and validated as mentioned in 
the methodology and instrumentation sections.  I conducted data collection in two phases 
after the approval of the Institutional Review Board at Walden University.  During the 
first phase between January 2011 and December 2012, I evaluated secondary data 
collected from five African countries including Ivory Coast, whereas the second phase of 
data collection focused on Ivory Coast from October 1 to November 3, 2017, depending 
on the availability of the participants.  I personally contacted all the participants, who 
agreed to participate in this research, to reduce the number of non-respondents.  I used a 
multi-tiered strategy of assertive tracking for all initial non-respondents by approaching 
them a second or even a third time via email or phone call.  The key to having low 
turnout responses was to develop a personal relationship with the participants.   
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Table 3  
Monthly Incident Reports 
 
Month 
FY11 Incidents FY12 Incidents 
Disc Loss Theft Total Disc Loss Theft Total 
Jan 85 35 10 130 201 47 11 259 
Feb 100 36 9 145 222 47 14 283 
March 219 32 5 256 187 59 10 256 
April 207 30 9 246 169 40 11 220 
May 231 34 9 274 141 51 5 197 
Jun 194 60 9 263 198 69 13 280 
Jul 243 52 10 305 253 47 7 307 
Aug 221 54 14 289 269 45 22 336 
Sept 203 47 11 261 324 65 7 396 
Oct 194 58 21 273 307 55 9 371 
Nov 188 50 10 248 271 61 12 344 
Dec 158 58 6 222 175 46 8 229 
Total 2,243 546 123 2,912 2,717 632 129 3,478 
% FY 
Incidents  77.0% 18.8% 4.2% 100.0% 78.1% 18.2% 3.7% 100.0% 
 
 
The peak volume of total incidents was the unimodal distributions for FY11 and 
occurred in July (Table 3).  However, the volume remained consistent throughout the 
year with January and February reflecting the lowest volumes.  In FY12, the distributions 
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were not skew with less consistent volumes and the peak volumes were bimodal 
distributions and occurred in September and October.  The histograms for reported 
incidents in both years were nonsymmetric distributions, and the disclosure was the most 
recurring incident with 77.0% in FY11 and 78.1% of total incidents.  
Recurring Incidents Breakdown Disclosures  
Table 4 provides a breakdown of all disclosure incidents reported in 2011 and 
2012.  The number of disclosure incidents reported monthly for two years did not show 
any significant pattern.  In FY11, disclosures appeared to follow a varying pattern based 
on the highest frequency in the months, whereas incidents did not reach their peak until 
September and October in FY12.  The total number of disclosure incidents per month for 
the year 2012 was 2,717, which is 21% greater than the total of 2,243 for 2011.  
Similarly, the average number of disclosures per month increased from 187 to 226.  
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Table 4  
Monthly Disclosure Reports 
 
Month FY11 FY12 
Jan 85 201 
Feb 100 222 
March 219 187 
April 207 169 
May 231 141 
Jun 194 198 
Jul 243 253 
Aug 221 269 
Sept 203 324 
Oct 194 307 
Nov 188 271 
Dec 158 175 
Total 2,243 2,717 
Average/Month 187 226 
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Losses of Wireless Aircards, Mobile Phone Devices, and USB Units 
Table 5 provides a breakdown of all losses reported in 2011 and 2012.  Incidents 
followed a similar, though not identical reporting pattern with the highest volume 
reported in June for both years.  Accordingly, a total number of losses per month in 2012 
was 632 with 16%, which is greater than the total of 546 for 2011.  An average number of 
losses increased from 46 to 53 per month, which could be because of increased volume 
and types of assets, such as wireless air cards, BlackBerry devices, and USB units, 
assigned to employees.   
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Table 5  
Monthly Losses 
                     
Month FY11 FY12 
Jan 35 47 
Feb 36 47 
March 32 59 
April 30 40 
May 34 51 
Jun 60 69 
Jul 52 47 
Aug 54 45 
Sept 47 65 
Oct 58 55 
Nov 50 61 
Dec 58 46 
Total 546 632 
Average/Month 46 53 
 
                      
Thefts of Laptop, Mobile Phone, and Wireless Card 
The number of stolen mobile devices reported in 2011 and 2012 are given in 
Table 6.  The variation across the month did not show any clear pattern.  For FY2011, the 
volume of incidents was consistent except for October with 21 thefts.  In contrast, the 
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highest volume of 22 was recorded in August in 2012.  The total number of thefts per 
month in 2012 was 129 accounting for a 5% greater than the total of 123 for 2011.  The 
monthly average of thefts increased slightly from an average of 10.3 in 2011 to 10.8 in 
2012.   
Table 6  
Monthly Theft Report 
 
 
Reporting Month FY11 FY12 
Jan        10       11 
Feb          9       14 
March          5       10 
April          9       11 
May          9         5 
Jun          9       13 
Jul         10         7 
Aug         14       22 
Sept         11        7 
Oct         21        9 
Nov         10      12 
Dec           6        8 
Total       123     129 
Average/Month      10.3   10.8 
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Background Data Analysis  
Interpretation of the Monthly Incident Reports for FY11 and FY12 
Table 7 reflects the number of incidents and assets used in this analysis.  Because 
one incident could contain multiple assets, the number of assets was more significant than 
the number of incidents.  
Table 7  
Incident Types 
Type of Incident 
Incidents Assets 
FY11 FY12 % Change FY11 FY12 % Change 
Disclosure (Disc) 2,243 2,717 21.1% 2,347 2,802 19.4% 
Loss 546 632 15.8% 592 668 12.8% 
Theft 123 129 4.9% 165 186 12.7% 
Grand Total 2,912 3,478 19.4% 3,104 3,656 17.8% 
 
 
From FY11 to FY12, the ABC Bank experienced an increase of 21%, 16%, and 
5% increase in disclosures, losses, and thefts, whereas the number of assets lost, stolen, 
or disclosed increased by 18%.  Thefts were the only incident type, where the number of 
assets increased at a higher rate than the number of incidents, suggesting that the thefts 
were more likely to involve multiple assets.  Thus, I investigated recurring monthly 
incidents for FY11 and FY12, and their impacts on data breaches. 
Analysis of Incidents 
This section included data on the overall number of incidents for disclosures, 
losses, and thefts.  For each reporting month, disclosures generally represented the 
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highest number of incidents, followed by losses and thefts.  For FY11, disclosures 
accounted for 77% of all incidents, followed by losses at 19% and thefts at 4%.  The 
percentages for FY12 were almost identical, with disclosures at 78%, losses at 18%, and 
thefts at 4%.  Populations for FY11 and FY12 incidents were 2,912 and 3,478, 
respectively, and determined based on reported incidents. 
Examination of the Previous Incident Reports and Analysis 
I hypothesized that the monthly incidents are statistically significant and have an 
impact on data.  I tested the hypothesis using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, 
which is an inferential statistical test whether the means are different significantly from 
each other.  It assumes that the dependent variable has an interval or ratio scale.  In this 
example, I tested the response to the question to determine incidents impact on data.  The 
null hypothesis, H0, was µDisc = µLoss = µTheft, where µ represents the mean incident, 
whereas the alternative hypothesis, Ha, was µDisc ≠ µLoss ≠ µTheft at a significance level α 
of .05.  Because the incident was ratio scaled approximately and had three groups, the 
between-subjects ANOVA was appropriate.  I analyzed data using IBM SPSS software.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Output 1 
For each dependent variable (e.g., IncidentNum), I obtained the descriptive output 
consisting of sample size, mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, standard error, 
and confidence interval for each level of the (quasi) independent variables and presented 
in Table 8. 
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Table 8  
FY11 & FY12 Descriptive Incident Reports  
 
Output 2  
The ANOVA results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference 
among incident types, F(5, 71) = 105.11, p = .000.  I used the Tukey's Honest Significant 
Difference (HSD) test as the post hoc multiple comparisons test to identify specific 
conditions that were different from each other.  As evident in Table 9, the majority of p 
values for mean difference are less than .05 suggesting the statistically significant 
difference between mean values.  Among them, eight values are greater than .05 and 
correspond to a comparison between Loss and Theft conditions, indicating that both 
conditions are not significantly different in terms of incident outcomes.  In contrast, 
Disclosure, Loss, and Theft conditions were significantly different.  
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Table 9  
Tukey’s HSD Results 
 
Output 3 
The homogenous subset results listed the groups in the order of ascending means.  
As evident in Table 10, Loss and Theft incidents might not have any impact if they were 
not discovered, whereas Disclosure incidents could have a high impact on confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability.  
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Table 10  
Homogenous Subsets of Incidents 
 
Output 4 
The impacts of incidents could change over time.  Therefore, independent 
variables, incidents, might have different impacts on their dependent variables according 
to the number of incidents.  Thus, I conducted a bar graph analysis to understand the 
FY12 and FY11 incidents within groups.  
Analysis of the Bar Graph 
As evident in Figure 1, the number of incidents in FY12 had increased for 
Disclosure and Loss and remained the same for Theft.  Therefore, Disclosure was the 
worst incidents accounting for 78% from FY11 to FY12.   
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Figure 1. Three major incidents (Disclosure, Theft, and Loss) from annual reports. 
Issues of Trustworthiness  
Trustworthiness is a significant concept as it enables a researcher to explain 
virtues of qualitative terms outside of parameters, which are generally used in the 
quantitative study without the bias nature of data collection and analysis.  Additionally, 
trustworthiness shows that the results are accurate and consistent, and the outcomes of 
data analysis are genuine.  Therefore, it is important that each step during the analysis, 
such as data collection, data treatment, data organization, and the result reporting, is 
trustworthy (Elo et al., 2014). Credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability are the measures used to evaluate the trustworthiness of a qualitative 
study (Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013).  The overall hypothesis of this case 
study underlined the following accepted conclusions: 
• Average incident scores among disclosure, loss, and theft were different.  
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• Average disclosure scores were more significant than even the combined 
average of loss and theft.  
• Statistic results showed that disclosure incidents were widespread. 
Credibility 
I used continual observation, utilization of existing concepts, and the agreement 
of participants with transcription of their interview, and triangulation to establish the 
credibility.  Participants had the chance to review copies of 
transcriptions of the interview, survey and questionnaire, and to correct any mistakes or 
misinterpretations of their responses.  The internal validation process of triangulation is 
an important method to improve the credibility and validity of study outcomes (Carter, 
Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso, Blythe, & Neville, 2014).  Selecting participants of different 
genders, with different levels of education, and with varying experience levels was useful 
for triangulation.   
Data were sorted from the highest to lowest based on the total asset volume.  A 
large number of different types of assets were consolidated into similar categories.  For 
FY11 and FY12, the top five asset types by volume were hardcopy documents, sensitive 
data, wireless air cards, mobile phones, and laptops.  Except for laptops, other categories 
experienced an increase from FY11 to FY12.  The volume of incidents involving 
hardcopy and sensitive data was reflective of the use of a large volume of customer 
contact and correspondence the ABC Bank initiated through mail and fax.  In addition, 
there was a significant increase in wireless air cards and USB units because these assets 
have been distributed widely to employees.  In contrast, there was an overall decrease of 
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7% in the number of laptop losses and thefts.  Because of the large volume of PII that 
these assets could contain, the decrease in these incidents is significant. 
Transferability 
Transferability is defined as the degree, to which study outcomes can be 
generalized to another population (Munhall, 2012).  Sample size and the diversity of the 
participants are some of the factors that determine the transferability of study 
outcomes.  The study participants consisted of male and female genders, who came from 
five organizations and fulfilled the selection criteria.  Therefore, this study results may 
have some transferability since the participant responses related to data breach incidents 
were diverse (Table 11).  Table 11 contains data on the volume for a different type of 
assets involved in each incident type and provides a breakdown of the percentage of 
disclosure, loss, and theft incidents for each type of asset.  Additional details about the 
top six asset types by volume were provided in the following subsections.  In addition, 
the RQ survey, questionnaire and interview questions were the same for each participant 
and I did not significantly interfere when they responded. 
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Table 11  
Reported Asset Types 
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Dependability 
Dependability is the extent that the study could be repeated by other researchers 
to get consistent results.  That is, the dissertation should provide adequate information for 
a person to replicate the study in Africa.  Such information includes adopted methods, 
study context, population, samples, and sample selection criteria. Therefore, 
scrutinization of the study and the outcomes could be possible (Thomas & Magilvy, 
2011).  It even appeared that organizations in Africa countries have similar causes of data 
breach issues due to the outdated business environment, in which they continue to 
operate.  
Hardcopy documents or sensitive data accounted for almost all of the disclosure 
incidents, whereas losses of hardcopy documents accounted for 39% of all losses in FY11 
and 35% in FY12 (Table 12).  Losses of wireless aircards increased from 18% of all 
losses in FY11 to 25% in FY12 and laptop losses remained constant at 6% of all losses 
for each year.  Thefts of laptops showed a decrease from 36% to 25% of overall thefts.  
The USB units had the highest increase in thefts, rising from 2% of thefts in FY11 to 
21% in FY12.   
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Table 12  
Combined Asset Types 
 
 
As evident in Table 13, hardcopy documents experienced the highest volume of 
incidents, increasing from 63% of all assets in FY11 to 66% on FY12.  Table 13 provides 
a breakdown of incidents involving hard copy documents based on the location of the 
loss or theft or the method of disclosure.  Key finding included: 
• Incidents involving hardcopy documents sent through the mail had the highest 
volumes, followed by the fax and ABC Bank facility.  Hardcopy incidents in 
the mail generally involved sending incorrect documents to the customer.   
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• The greatest percentage increase of 241% was related to incidents involving 
the transcript delivery system, where transcripts were sent to an incorrect third 
party.   
• Hardcopy documents disclosed in-person increased by 65% and generally 
involved false documents handed to a clientele or third party. 
Table 13  
Hardcopy Incident Locations
 
Conformability 
The concept of confirmability is a comparable concern to objectivity and refers to 
the degree, to which data can be confirmed or corroborated (Cope, 2014).  There are 
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various techniques for improving confirmability such as an audit strategy, where the 
researcher checks and rechecks the transcription to ensure their accuracy.  I shared the 
transcription with participants so that they can review and clarify if there were any 
discrepancies. 
The Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General reported a laptop and external 
hard drive containing the names, birth dates and social security numbers of about 26.5 
million active-duty troops and veterans were stolen on May 3, 2006, from a veteran 
affairs data analyst in Aspen Hill.  The theft was the largest information security breach 
in the history of the government and raised fears of potential mass identity theft.  As a 
result, the Department of Veterans Affairs agreed to pay $20 million to current and 
former military personnel to settle a class action lawsuit on behalf of men and women, 
whose personal data was on the stolen laptop.  Subsequently, I could conclude that cyber-
incidents have severe impacts on data breaches due to human factors.  From this 
assertion, I developed the data breach triangulation blueprint as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Data breach triangulation blueprint. 
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Ethical Procedures 
The rules governing the access to information or data for researchers are not 
defined clearly on the international level.  For example, mobile network providers are 
subject to different regulations on data retention depending on their location.  Data 
retention laws are under debate because they conflict with the privacy requirements 
(Bloomberg, 2014).  Meanwhile, privacy regulations are on a national level despite the 
international operations of mobile network providers.  Data protection directive of the 
E.U. (95/46/EC), for example, only covered the E.U. citizens or within the E.U. territory 
(Gasson, Kosta, Royer, Meints, & Warwick, 2011).   
Most African countries lack a locally binding legal framework to govern the 
release of data.  Therefore, data release follows an ad hoc framework, in which the only 
binding commitment to privacy and data protection was made between researchers and 
the company through a non-disclosure oral agreement.  The francophone, West Africa 
countries, use a version of strict data protection regulations from France established by 
the Commission Nationale Information et Liberte, although the implementation and 
enforcement are a problem due to social and cultural factors.  In addition, Ivory Coast is 
not a signatory; hence, many companies operate with minimum or no data protection 
policy.   
In most African countries, enforcement regarding the protection of data and 
citizen rights is weak, resulting in limited power for organizations to use and distribute 
data under their own patronages.  In addition, data protection or retention is at the 
discretion of companies in Ivory Coast or other Africa countries.  Thus, constraints from 
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the Ivory Coast regulator on privacy seemed to be minimal.  Consequently, in most 
African countries, many people mentioned that signing a formal document outlining 
privacy and consent would not be necessary, and it would perhaps discourage potential 
participants in many African countries.  The most recommended practice for a researcher 
was to build mutual trust with the participants by understanding and respecting their 
culture and social environment to conduct a successful research study because the 
participants preferred to remain anonymous and confidential.  Ethical risks in 
international research are substantial, complex, and continue to grow, especially in 
developing countries like Ivory Coast and many West Africa countries.  To ensure that 
the participants, populations, and communities were not harmed or exploited, I also 
followed the U.S. regulations, though it might increase risks, for example, around the 
informed consent, where the cultures were different from the U.S.  The international 
research ethical risks are beyond the boundaries of the research oversight infrastructure of 
Walden University.  Thus, risk mitigations must rely on thoughtful and informed 
judgments; otherwise, researchers may not pursue research in these areas or may not 
overcome ethical challenges in protecting human research participants in developing 
countries, especially in Africa, related to data breaches.  
Summary 
In summary, uniform solutions to prevent data breaches are difficult due to 
human-related factors.  Despite the existence of the emerging technologies that could 
prevent data breaches, hackers still launch a significant number of attacks by exploiting 
the weaknesses in information systems of organizations or their employees.  Therefore, 
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organizations require a strong leadership to upgrade technology frequently and to ensure 
that the internal human factors do not cause any data breaches.  In this dissertation, I 
interviewed 27 participants, who had insights on how to develop solutions to prevent data 
breaches occurring due to internal employees in the Ivory Coast cyber-ecosystems.  
Hence, one-third of the interviews were focused on external data breaches, whereas two-
thirds were on internal human factors data breaches.  This chapter elaborated on the 
experimental design used in this study to collect data needed to address the research 
questions.  The ANOVA test followed by the Tukey’s post hoc test found that 
overcoming data breaches and internal human factors are essential to minimize the cyber-
security threats.  Chapter 4 provided an in-depth analysis of data collected in this study 
followed by Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
Several organizations and government entities continuously experience data 
breaches caused by external people or internal employees.  Many organizations and 
government entities are aware of the risks that internal human factors might pose to the 
data security of a company.  Historically, outsiders have carried out data breaches, 
costing hundreds of thousands of dollars (often millions more).  However, traditional 
security measures could control outsider threats.  In contrast, threats due to internal 
human factors, specifically accidental errors or deliberate acts, cause relatively more 
damages to an organization (PWC, 2015).  Therefore, the purpose of this study was to 
provide executives with guidelines on the prevention of data breaches from cyber-threats 
by focusing on internal human behavior.   
I used a qualitative mixed-methods approach to comprehensively capture user 
experience because it could be difficult to answer why and how with a quantitative study 
alone.  I examined the assumed causal relationship between the internal human factors 
(i.e., employees behaviors), and the occurrence of data breaches or compromised 
information.  Speicfically, I used this qualitative approach to identify the assumed root 
causes of threats from internal human factors.  In addition, I used this approach to 
understand the perspectives of participants on how managers can minimize internal 
human factor threats that contribute to data breaches or compromised information. 
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The three research questions focused on why, how many, and how widespread.  
This chapter contains data analysis which I used to answer the following three research 
questions, where each RQ was categorized by subthemes:  
RQ1:  What are the internal human factors that contribute to data breaches and 
compromised information in the Ivory Coast emerging business environments?  
RQ2: What are the root causes of the internal human factors that contribute to 
data breaches and compromised information in the Ivory Coast businesses?  
RQ3: What preventative measures could managers use to minimize the threat 
from human factors, which are related to an internal employee, that contribute to data 
breaches or compromised information? 
This chapter also contains evidence of trustworthiness, and descriptions of the 
setting, demographics, data collection timeline, and coding.  The results section describes 
results based on the categorical findings and theoretical results.  Finally, I revisit the 
conceptual framework for this study and discuss it alongside the phenomenal theory of 
internal human factors related to cyber-threats to organizations. 
Study Setting 
The study site was Abidjan, Ivory Coast, West Africa, between October 1 and November 
3, 2017.  I did not have any community partners; therefore, I liaised unofficially with 
some Ivorian community stakeholders, including the government officials and the heads 
of department in organizations in Abidjan, Ivory Coast to identify the prospective 
participants.  I discussed the purpose of the research with these officials and emphasized 
the benefits of the outcomes of this research study to minimize the human factors of 
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employees that contribute to data breaches or compromised information.  Then, I 
requested that officials distribute the research flyer to their employees to solicit their 
participation in the research study.  Interested participants contacted me directly via 
phone to maintain their privacy and confidentiality.    
Selection of Research Participants  
The research participants consisted of government ministers, department heads, 
CFOs, branch managers, CIOs, IT division managers, and information systems 
technicians (see Table 14).  I used the snowball sampling process for the target 
population to build purposely selected samples for this study.  I started with unofficial 
visits to different organizations and requested that managers distribute the flyers to their 
employees as the population seed for the snowball sampling.  With each visit, the size of 
the sample and snowball grew.  I chose the next organization for the visit by logically 
assessing the potential for obtaining the perspectives that were beneficial to the study.  
Eventually, I sampled from five organizations and 50 employees.  Although I received 
expressions of interest from 50 employees from five different public and private 
organizational structures within Abidjan, Ivory Coast, only 27 participants agreed to 
participate in the study.  All participants read and signed the consent form in duplicates 
and retained a copy for personal record purposes before the research study began.  
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Table 14  
Participant Description 
Organization  Type Number  
Comp X&T 
Government ministers 1 
CIOs 3 
IT division managers 2 
Comp Z & C 
Government ministers 2 
CFO 2 
Information systems technicians 3 
Comp B & X 
CIOs 2 
Government minister 1 
Comp T & C 
IT division managers  4 
Government ministers 1 
Comp C & Z 
Information systems technicians 4 
CFO 2 
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Demographic Data 
 I did not collect any specific demographic details such as age and race.  The 
selected participants included both genders, including 20 men and 7 women.  Most 
participants had the privilege to access accounts, whereas some participants had some 
level of elevated permissions in the computer system of organizations or supervised 
employees with such elevated permissions.   
Survey, Questionnaire, and Interview Data Collection 
The instrument used for this research consisted of surveys developed by Basu and 
Muylle (2011) and O’Keeffe, Buytaert, Brozovic, and Sinha (2016), a questionnaire, and 
interview scripts using semi-structured questions including open-ended questions and the 
Likert scale questions.  These semi-structured questions were helpful for collecting 
descriptions of experiences related to creating IT business values, maximization and 
evaluation, and for understanding techniques to overcome data breaches due to human 
factors.  Phenomenological studies include observation, note taking during the 
interviews, and field notes, which were essential to understanding the operative of 
internal human factor threats.  
To ensure the privacy of the participants and their organizations, I assigned each 
participant a different alias such as Comp1 and Emp1 for five selected organizations.  I 
conducted the survey for four days from October 3 to October 6, 2017.  The participants 
completed 21 survey questions, including open-ended questions and questions with 1 to 4 
scales ranging from zero important to highly important.  On the fourth day, I collected 
the survey data by appointment only.  Then, participants completed 21 questions from the 
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questionnaire from October 10 to October 13, 2017.  Each participant had aliases, such as 
4hjb5, k67rb, and w3ev1, to protect the identities.  Data was collected by appointment 
only in a private hotel meeting room on the fourth days.  Last, each participant answered 
16 face-to-face interview questions.  The interview comprised three parts with the first 
part focusing on the risks related to malicious insiders and unintentional insiders, while 
the second part focused on data access and responsibilities of employees using the 1 to 5 
scales.  The third part concentrated on the state of cyber-defense using the 1 to 5 scales.  
The interviews lasted between 15 minutes and 30 minutes, and took place in a private 
hotel meeting room between October 17 and October 19, 2017.  Participant received 
aliases such as Ca45 to protect their identity.  
I entered the collected data in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and reviewed their 
usability.  The collected data were secured using logical (i.e., authorization, 
authentication, encryption, and password) and physical (i.e., restricted access and locked 
file cabinets) protections in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.  I changed the key code and door-lock 
combinations regularly to prevent all physical access to data.  I used data discovery tools 
to identify sensitive data that were inadequately protected.  I used a safe and secure 
network IPSec protocol to protect research data while in transit over a public or private 
network.  I also used different names from actual data while data was at rest.  Lastly, I 
used SecureZip to protect all data on a laptop and encrypted USB.  All research data will 
be kept for at least 5 years as required by Walden University before proper disposal.  
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Data Coding  
The collected data were recorded in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet according to 
their themes.  Then, I used the statistical frequency and proportion to tabulate the 
categorical data and the corresponding codes are given in Appendix A.  Discrepant cases 
did not emerge, possibly due to the nature of the study.  The findings were factored into 
the analysis and data segments were inductively incorporated into a subcategory or 
category.  Emergent themes expanded my understanding of the existing theoretical 
framework proposed by Loch et al. (1992).  Furthermore, I shared the collected data, 
including the interview transcriptions, with the respective participants for validation and 
to protect their identity and privacy.   
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
The evidence of trustworthiness was evident from the research design, data 
collection, data analysis, and interpretation.  Use of the grounded theory concept and a 
constant comparative method increased the validity of the study.  The participants 
reviewed their responses to the survey, questionnaire and interview for clarity along with 
the subthemes, core categories, and theoretical findings after completion of the study, 
contributing to the trustworthiness of the study.  Participants had multiple opportunities 
to review data and clarify or correct whenever required.   
Further, the purpose of a qualitative research is not to generalize findings, rather, 
it is to understand a phenomenon (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 319).  Therefore, it is 
difficult to generalize the results of this study to other organizations.  However, the 
concepts, including core categories and theoretical conceptualizations and models 
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emerged from this study, could be considered by other organizations.  The knowledge 
gained could be applied to other organizations, at least after a critical review, despite the 
potential differences between workplace environments.  Corbin and Strauss (2008) stated 
that “concepts should apply to many organizations, though specifics might differ” (p. 
320).   
Coding is primarily an analytical process and several past studies have provided 
guidelines for coding.  For example, Miles and Huberman (1994) stated that emergent 
themes should be linked to a theoretical model (pp. 134-137).  Models are the 
simplification of reality; hence, investigator and peers should determine the degree that a 
model describes the event and perform proper validation of the models (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003, p. 278).  Denzin and Lincoln (2003, p. 278) discussed that the grounded 
theory models generally should be validated using the experts.  In this study, there were 
no informants and the subject matter experts were the participants.  Therefore, the 
theoretical models were developed and shared through the constant comparative process, 
as if they were mainly a quasi-peer review. 
Results 
The results of this study are divided into the following three subsections 
according to the themes:  
• Internal human factors that contribute to data breaches. 
• Root causes of internal human factors that contribute to data breaches.   
• Preventive measures to minimize the internal human factors that contribute to 
data breaches. 
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Many researchers have adapted the human information processing models to illustrate the 
errors of individuals at different stages of a business.  Conzola and Wogalter (2001) 
discussed the impacts of incentives from the environment on the human sensory system 
using the communication-human information processing model and the findings are still 
relevant.  A subset of information is attended to, comprehended, and aligned (or 
misaligned) with attitudes, beliefs, and motivations of an individual, resulting in the 
behavioral responses.  With the increase in new connected devices, many new and 
unknown security threats have emerged from megatrends and technologies such as 
BYOD, mobility, cloud computing and internet usage, as well as internal accidental and 
malicious actions, introducing organizations to a multitude of new risks contributing to 
data breaches. 
Research Question 1 
Many documented data breaches were accidental due to unintentional employee 
behaviors.  Human errors often are patterns of recurrence when examined over time.  
Information breaches due to internal human factors are caused by individuals, who seek 
to damage organizations or undermine information security due to various causes.  
Instead, the human errors causing negative impacts are often the consequences of 
ineffective system conditions, process features, or individual employee characteristics, 
and are known as the system induced human errors (Norman, 2013).  The insider threats 
continue to be mostly accidental and carelessness.  A holistic approach to identifying the 
internal human factors responsible for data breaches and compromised information in 
Ivory Coast is essential to protect the landscape of Ivory Coast cyber-ecosystem. 
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Internal Security Challenges and Recommendations  
Unintentional exposure of organizations to risks due to the actions of some 
employees could damage organizations.  Eighteen participants commented that many 
employees in Ivory Coast engage in behaviors that could put the corporate and personal 
data at risk.  Eleven participants mentioned that top managers generally do not allocate 
proper resources for IT-related projects, whereas five participants stated that IT 
professionals are often unaware of the behaviors of employees and that it is a business-
wide challenge to prevent data leakage or breaches due to lack of funds.  According to 15 
participants (56%), the most prominent internal challenges for most security 
professionals are errors of employees, ineffective security deployment and managing 
hostile behaviors.  Endsley (1995) called the above challenges as the situation awareness 
and defined as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in 
the near future” (p.36).  Furthermore, 14 participants (52%) agreed that implementing 
adequate security measures and controls are critical to overcoming the internal security 
challenges.  Seventy percent of the participants indicated that executives could achieve 
the maximum returns in business if they have a good knowledge and understanding of 
emerging global business and technology requirements with the IoT.  They also 
commented that providing continuous exposure and training to IT managers on the 
business and technical skills could maximize the return from the IT investment, which 
agrees with the view of Rodgers (2000) that the effective decision making to reduce error 
rates generally depends on having a good situation awareness.  However, resolving 
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internal security challenges is inefficient if an organization does not address workplace 
violence with adequate mitigation plans. 
Workplace Violence Impact on Data  
The definition of workplace violence is the unsafe climate and job environment 
for employees and the survival of an organization.  Twenty-six participants (96%) said 
avoiding the ethnic discrimination and detecting the unhappy employees could reduce 
workplace violence on data or information of an organization.  Thus, 14 respondents 
(52%) indicated that an organization should have security guards to protect itself both 
inside and outside of its perimeters.  In addition, 12 of them suggested that the workplace 
crisis team should assist or investigate any issues related to workplace violence with a 
zero-tolerance policy.  Having workplace violence mitigation and dissuasion plans could 
allow organizations to operate in a safer environment and diminish some insider 
accidental threats. 
Insider Accidental Threats: Causes and Mitigations 
Although external actors are considered as the biggest threat to cyber-security of 
an organization, many documented data breaches are due to various unintentional 
behaviors of employees (Sarabi, Naghizadeh, Liu & Liu, 2016).  Accidents due to human 
errors often form patterns of recurrence when examined over time (Pond, 2003).  As 
Julius Caesar said to Brutus, Et tu, Brute?, which means Even you, Brutus, my best 
friend, when Caesar resigned himself to his fate.  Therefore, it is critical to identify the 
root causes of insider accidental threats and their mitigation to avoid the Caesar fate 
within organizations.  Additionally, human factors and performance indicators such as 
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high subjective mental workload, lack or loss of situation awareness, and mind wandering 
could increase the likelihood of human errors, resulting in incidents related to internal 
systems, data, or information (Martin & Jones, 1984).  The results of this study indicated 
that 19 participants (71%) attributed the insider accidental threats to human failures 
trusted employees and lax cultural environments.   
Human inadequacies resulted in costly accidents by insiders with access to the 
most sensitive information.  To mitigate insider accidental threats, 14 respondents (52%) 
recommended developing a security culture from top to down and setting up automatic 
alerts for sensitive devices at risk.  Furthermore, 18 respondents (67%) mentioned that 
malicious employees, unzipped sensitive data, and untrained employees are the leading 
causes of insider deliberate threats.  Additionally, 13 participants (48%) suggested that 
implementing employee training to identify the risks accurately and improving overall 
security posture could reduce insider deliberate threats.  Furthermore, 15 participants 
(55%) said that an organization should provide an effective phishing detection and 
information security training, whereas 14 participants accounting for 52% suggested 
security+ and network+ certifications as additional training.   
Precautionary Measures to Minimize Insider Threats 
The new components during expansion of IT infrastructure of an organization 
could introduce new vulnerabilities, whereas not all employees understand rapidly 
changing IT environment (Sarabi et al., 2016).  Consequently, companies are exposed to 
internal threats from employees.  According to 18 participants (67%), ineffective 
software patching, management, password sharing and recycling, and absence of 
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encryption are the security issues faced by many organizations.  Furthermore, 21 
participants (78%) stated that managers could develop a culture of security solution, 
security awareness, and computer login limitations to change employee attitudes to 
minimize insider threats.  Attitudes do not have any significance unless people choose 
vector, namely positive, negative, or neutral, which define eventually the outcomes of the 
human existential environment at work or in society.   
There are greater concerns when dealing with internal security threats.  Twenty-
two participants (82%) attributed internal security threats challenges to ethnic factors, 
organizational culture, and non-malicious insiders.  The participants agreed that attitudes 
are learned behaviors, habits, perceptions, and judgments.  Therefore, understanding 
insider threats is essential for managers to develop multiple approaches to reduce insider 
threats.  Thereafter, managers determine to adopt or keep the mitigation methods within 
an organization to combat insider threats.  Developing a positive business attitude helps 
employees to take initiative to improve their skills by voluntarily enrolling in more 
security courses to be more efficient in their security management responsibilities.  Most 
participants tried to take more security courses to fill the knowledge gap and understand 
the business better to realize the maximum benefits from IT investments (Table 15). 
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Table 15  
Security Management Responsibilities 
Security element Preferred selected topics Results 
Security management  Operations security/Cyber- security trends 89% 
 
Personal security 
Effective security awareness 85% 
Conducting effective security self-inspection 81% 
 
Information systems security 
Employee internet access security  85% 
85% Fundamentals of information security systems 
 
Global security issues 
Protecting business operations 85% 
Critical infrastructure threats 78% 
Information security Mobile device security risks 93% 
Identity theft techniques 89% 
Physical security Disaster planning 81% 
Protecting information from physical threats 78% 
Professional development Communicating security risks to senior managers  78% 
Proving value as a security professional 70% 
 
Training and awareness programs should focus on enhancing employee skills and 
behaviors, and help them to identify possible cognitive biases and limitations that could 
lead to a higher risk of committing such errors or judgment.  Additionally, the 
participants mentioned that the positive attitude of an organization could help employees 
to fulfill their roles and responsibilities effectively and to have a comfortable work life.  It 
is important for employees to combine positive thinking and attitude, which are the core 
of success and a brighter future in life and at work.  Therefore, the benefits of having 
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adequate training and awareness programs are diverse and important for a better 
relationship between organizations and employees.  
Security Awareness Training  
Employees are the critical human component for information security of an 
organization and the awareness program provides employees with tools and information 
that they require to make the security as the second nature.  Twenty participants (74%) 
were interested in participating in continuous security awareness training programs and 
preferred to extend security awareness training workshops to developing the effective 
security procedures, policies and a technology control plan.  Moreover, 21 participants 
(78%) emphasized that organizations should include user behavioral analysis, data 
protection, and mobile device management to minimize data breaches by overcoming 
internal threats.  Furthermore, 25 participants (93%) identified the location as the 
predominant factor that determines their participation in security awareness training, 
while the registration fee was a concern for 23 respondents (85%).  According to them, 
examining and analyzing insider threats is a common practice in developing the 
characteristics of the most critical incidents in the form of a general set of models such as 
management and education of the risk of insider threat (MERIT) models.  The models 
identify common patterns, contributing factors and observables, and mitigation measures 
targeting effective training topics due to the employee feedback.  Improved 
understanding of employees about the impacts of computing behavior on the security of 
the company could lead to positive results for the company.  However, the 
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overconfidence of companies and institutions in their labor force could make them 
vulnerable to malicious employees (Appendix A). 
Research Question 2 
Twenty-seven participants thought that internal human factor threats are difficult 
to prevent because generally, they are unintentional.  Therefore, a holistic approach to 
security is vital in the modern threat landscape to combat the risks due to unintentional or 
malicious intents.  The approach should address effectively insider and outsider threats 
together with successful management of both unintentional and intentional threats posed 
by internal human factor threats (employees). 
Organizations Incident Types 
Their betrayals of employees through corporate espionage, embezzlement, data 
theft, or double-crossing damage many organizations profoundly.  Trusted insiders of 
organizations could have the power and the will to damage the organization.  After the 
infamous National Security Agency data leaks and various well-publicized thefts of 
corporate resources, including the intellectual property, customer lists, or money, 
executives have focused on developing the best approach to protect their information 
assets from malicious insiders and to detect potentially problematic employees 
beforehand.  
Employees often have access to the most sensitive information.  Six participants 
(21%) mentioned that the most successful security attacks by employees are the exposure 
of sensitive data, theft of intellectual property and the introduction of malware.  
Additionally, 13 participants (48%) indicated that disclosure of sensitive data, loss or 
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theft of IT Assets and malicious codes are the leading incident types within their 
organizations.  According to 17 participants (63%), most incidents happened after work 
hours with 37% of incidents occurred in cars when employees were in transit to home 
with IT assets, 30% were because employees left assets unattended on their desks or not 
secured in office, whereas 22% of them happened in a hotel when traveling.   
Nineteen participants said that 63% of assets were lost, whereas 37% were stolen 
from the locked areas.  Meanwhile, 56% were not in locked areas and 19% were 
unknown.  Interestingly, 48% of the stolen assets did not show any signs of forced entry 
and 33% of them occurred by the forced entry.  X, Z, B, T and C facilities, office desks, 
cabinets, and storage room share 85% of the lost or stolen assets.  Further, 17 participants 
(62%) mentioned that the stolen assets were in the unsecure places, whereas 23% of these 
incidents were unknown and only 15% were locked in secure areas.  Meanwhile, assets of 
organizations were lost or stolen from 78% of interiors and 22% of trunks of the vehicles.  
The participants indicated that 48% of the lost assets were laptops or phones and 18 
participants (67%) confirmed that these laptops and mobile devices did not have any 
enterprise disk encryption, whereas 63% of them did not have any cable locks.  Twenty-
three research participants (87%) agreed that most IT security threats are due to the 
unintentional mistakes of the insiders than any malicious abuse of privileges.    
Disclosure of Sensitive Data 
Sending the sensitive documents to unintended recipients is a primary insider 
error.  According to 14 participants (52%), the sensitive data were disclosed due to the 
errors in faxing, lost packages and the errors in emailing.  Companies notified the local 
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mail coordinator in 48% of the disclosure cases, whereas 37% did not.  Moreover, 22% of 
incidents were unable to trace.  Furthermore, 63% of these incidents occurred with the 
local post office and 37% with the internal mail delivery.  Access to data, even highly 
sensitive data, is difficult for many organizations to manage because of the changing business 
environments and the complexities of the modern workforce.  Most companies in Ivory 
Coast did not appear to have any data protection or there was no enforcement if they did. 
Data Protection 
Most companies in Ivory Coast did not appear to have the SBU data protection.  
Twenty-one participants (78%) pointed out the non-existence of data protection laws or 
the laws did not consider the social cyber-threat.  Furthermore, 74% of the companies did 
not have an internal review code to protect their data.  Because the cyber-threat landscape 
is evolving continuously, the most sophisticated threats are constantly changing to adapt 
to the defenses against them, especially with the access to increased mobile devices and 
changing business environments. 
 Internal Risk Factors 
The insider threats are intense because of increased mobile and hyper-connected 
world.  Almost every employee has the multiple interconnected devices that could 
compromise information of a company.  Similarly, the social norms are shifting, eroding 
loyalty between employers and employees (Coburn et al., 2018).  According to the 
participants, the internal risk factors are due to 26% of careless or negligent, 22% of 
inadvertent exposure, 19% of email accidents, 11% of BYOD, and 7% of curiosity, 
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innocent actions, and malicious insiders.  Furthermore, 27 respondents stated the 
following: 
• security softie (weak) - 30%;  
• Non-enforcement of the security policy – 26%;  
• gadget geek (overly knowledgeable of business assets) - 19%; 
• business work environments - 15%; and 
• Saboteur (deliberate destruction of company data or assets) and squatter 
(intruder accessing organization data without right or title) – 10%. 
 Most participants said that increased data breaches could be primarily due to the 
internal threats.  The risk factor threats of employees could be a major threat to 
businesses in Africa.  Efforts to mitigate the internal threats, such as additional security 
controls and improved vetting of new employees, could remain at odds with the 
efficiency measures.  More internal human factor threats with malicious intent could 
emerge as more employees in Ivory Coast place their ethics, ethnic groups and 
perceptions above those of their employers (Appendix A). 
Research Question 3 
Twenty-three participants identified several internal human factors threats related 
to data leakage, for example, fraudulent actions through an integrity breach, loss of 
availability, or business continuity because of the mistakes or deliberate actions.  In 
general, internal threats could cause significant impacts on business because of the 
privileges that employees have over IT, being responsible for their actions, in 
contradiction to external threats. 
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Dealing with Insiders Risks 
Twenty-seven participants said that management of insider risks should consider 
malicious, negligence and accidental risky behaviors.  Once the risk is identified and 
assessed, executives should implement the technical and management controls and align 
the roles, responsibilities, and privileges throughout the employment life cycle.  They 
also indicated that many executives in organizations in Abidjan, Ivory Coast are not 
aware of the complexity and unfamiliarity of the new cyber-security threats, and do not 
have the expertise to deal with the internal human errors. 
Security Measures to Reduce Internal Human Errors 
Seventeen participants mentioned that human error is not defined 
comprehensively in the academic literature because the errors could occur in cognition 
and behaviors.  Features of the tools, tasks, and operating environment could have an 
influence on human errors (Dekker, 2002).  In this study, I defined human error as a 
failure.  Furthermore, the participants indicated that managers should consider the 
business environments to reduce the internal human errors, especially in Africa, where 
employees are more loyal to their ethnic groups than organizations.  Therefore, they 
argued that managers should focus on implementing adequate security measures to 
mitigate internal human errors.  Figure 3 shows the percentages of the security measures 
used to reduce the internal human errors.  Appendix A Part I has additional information. 
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Figure 3. Reducing internal human errors. 
The participants underscored that the above security measures could mitigate the 
internal human factor threats.  Because employees have access to sensitive information 
on a regular basis and are aware of the protection, they could steal or leak information 
easier than outsiders.  Employees could leak data accidentally by attaching the wrong file 
to an email, sharing on social media, losing a laptop or USB drive, or through some other 
mistake, which an outsider typically could not do.  Furthermore, these security measures 
could help managers to overcome several essential malicious insider threats, including 
fraud, intellectual property theft, sabotage, and espionage.  In this research, the 
participants identified the critical factors that characterized the different type of insider 
threats.  Twenty participants (74%) thought that managers should implement the 
following efficient security solutions to reduce internal malicious risks: 
• a process to identify assets and vulnerabilities; 
• identify the likely attack methods;  
Adequate 
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• identify all privileged accounts and credentials;  
• establish proactive and reactive strategies; and  
• No Windows power user groups. 
Similarly, 23 participants (85%) suggested that it is important for managers  to 
implement the following security solutions to reduce unintentional employee risks: 
• multifactor authentication; 
• employees controls; 
• risk assessment; 
• password management system; 
• BYOD policy;  
• security controls; and 
• security policies. 
The participants also emphasized that managers should secure data in the following 
breakdown structures due to the internal data breaches: 
• track sensitive data – 30%; 
• qualitative risk analysis approach – 26%; 
• information classification - 19%; 
• computer ethics - 15%; and 
• quantitative risk analysis approach - 10%. 
Some sensitive information requires special care and handling because the inappropriate 
handling of data could result in data breaches. 
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Sensitive Data Dwelling  
Data and applications reside on the network, endpoints, and in the continually 
evolving cloud ecosystem.  Seven participants (25%) admitted that most sensitive data 
are not in a secure store in most organizations.  However, the Ivory Coast businesses are 
entering into the global market with the IoT.  As a result, it is important for these 
organizations to secure a multitude of applications, users, devices, and 
infrastructures.  Twenty-seven participants said that the traditional methods are common 
in most organizations to store sensitive data in Ivory Coast and the use of encryption to 
secure data regardless of their storage formats according to the following breakdown: 
• floppy disk - 26%; 
• flash drive - 22%; 
• CD - 19%; 
• hardcopy - 15%; 
• Windows 2003 server - 11%; and 
• data discovery - 7%. 
Having improper data storage and protection could lead to the breach of data privacy and 
the security of the confidential personal information.  Additionally, improper data storage 
could create a significant data cost. 
Reducing Big Data Cost 
The Ivory Coast businesses had the need to reduce the cost of expensive data 
protections according to 27 participants.  Eighteen participants (66%) expressed the need 
for reducing data protection cost in the following order: 
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• move complete or partial data to the cloud; 
• implement data variable length deduplication, which is a technique to delete 
duplicate data; and 
• archive data.   
Moreover, 18 participants (66%) indicated that reducing data protection cost could help 
organizations to meet the audit compliance requirements, which can be achieved if 
managers is:  
• being sensitive to changes in their industry; 
• keeping compliance data and documentation secure; 
• paying attention to legacy IT systems; 
• having a disaster preparation readiness plan; 
• bringing known flaws to the forefront; and  
• knowing employees with access to data, applications, and systems, when, why 
and what. 
Data Access and Responsibilities of Employees 
Most participants expressed a significant concern about the access to data because 
data access tended to be unstructured in many organizations.  They also stressed that 
managers should not focus solely on the perimeter security, leaving the enterprise data being 
vulnerable to insider threats.  Organizations could rely on the static security perimeters to 
protect the onsite data centers; however, this is not a viable strategy due to the growing 
reliance on mobile and IoT devices as well as new threat types. 
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The employee threats could range from accessing data without proper 
authorization or downloading unauthorized software without understanding the potential 
risks.  According to 13 participants (48%), they often had the access to data, whereas five 
(19%) had somewhat often and three (11%) had somewhat very often, regardless of their 
roles and responsibilities.  Moreover, 14 participants (52%) mentioned that information 
security is only the responsibilities of IT.  In contrast, only five participants (19%) said it 
is the responsibilities of all employees.  It is worthy to note that most organizations in 
Ivory Coast did not have any internal data policies according to 15 participants (56%), 
whereas 14 participants (52%) mentioned that data protection enforcement significantly 
lacks within most organizations in Ivory Coast.  Two-thirds of participants agreed that 
data security is not the responsibility of everyone in the organization, whereas the rest, mostly 
CIO, IT managers and technicians, thought that everyone should protect the sensitive 
information and data for the survival of organization (Appendix A Part II for more 
information).  Unfortunately, many organizations do not identify new vulnerabilities 
quickly, especially in West Africa.  This is compounded by the anytime, anyplace, 
anywhere nature of accessing business data, everywhere from inside the network to 
application layers and mobile devices.   
Cyber-Defense  
Twenty-seven participants mentioned that several organizations and government 
entities were in the news lately across the globe due to data breaches caused by external 
people or internal employees.  They stated that many organizations need to implement 
security best practices and programs best suited to mitigate internal security threats.  To 
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effectively mitigate security threats, managers should know the state of their cyber-
defense before implementing any security measures. 
Cyber-Defense State 
Increased access to data of organizations on mobile devices and the use of cloud-
based services create new vulnerabilities together with IoT.  The participants from five 
different organizations had mixed perceptions of security threats and the measures used 
to counter them.  Sixteen participants (59%) indicated that existing security systems in 
Ivory Coast could not capture cyber-security threats sometimes.  Therefore, 24 
participants (88%) were unsure whether organizations could prevail from advance cyber-
attacks or stop insiders from stealing corporate information.  However, 12 participants 
(44%) strongly agreed that many businesses in Ivory Coast would not survive.  
However, 15 participants (56%) agreed that organizations could implement a 
strong security program to withstand the targeted insider attacks.  However, 11 
respondents (41%) were of the opinion that the monitoring sensitive data is a challenge in 
Africa, especially in the Ivory Coast (Figure 4).  Employees of many organizations in 
Ivory Coast are affiliated and loyal to their ethnic groups, regardless of the policies or 
security measures of an organization.  Therefore, it appeared that almost anyone could 
have the access to sensitive data of an organization without any bona fide need by being a 
member of an ethnic group (Appendix A Part III for more information). 
Eight participants highlighted that executives should develop a holistic approach 
to cyber-defense and develop a culture of data security.  Furthermore, they also stressed 
that effective data protection must encompass end-to-end encryption solutions for 
140 
 
endpoint devices, databases, networks, and applications (Refer to Appendix A for more 
information).  
 
Figure 4. Monitoring sensitive data. 
Summary 
According to the results of this study, managers should consider information 
security in a broader organizational context of mission or business success.  With the 
global market economy and interconnectivity, the support of the executive managers  
seemed to be lacking in addressing emerging threats with internal human factors.  An 
organization could not achieve the missions and business success without addressing the 
internal human factor threats in the global market economy with the IoT.  The human 
factor threats are likely to increase in the coming years and could be a significant threat to 
organizations.  Efforts to reduce these threats, such as additional security controls and 
improved vetting of new employees, could remain at odds with the efficiency measures.  
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More insiders with malicious intent could emerge because the increased number of 
employees prioritize their own ethics and perceptions over those of the employers.   
The dysfunction among the workforce is a challenge to mitigate the internal 
human factor threats.  The commitment of managers to create cyber-security awareness 
and training programs could have a critical impact on the perception of the staff about 
responsibilities in relation to securing organization information systems and maintaining 
safe cyber-environments.  Recognizing the importance of managing security risks and 
establishing appropriate governance structures for managing such risk are critical for 
organizations in Ivory Coast.  Chapter 5 contains the interpretation of the findings, a 
discussion of research limitations, recommendations for further research, and the 
implications for social change. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to provide executives with a framework to guide 
them in deciding how to prevent data breaches from cyber-threats by focusing on internal 
human behavior.  The interconnected world with its network communications has 
changed the ways people do business with the IOT, leading to increased cyber-attacks on 
information and data of organizations.  Security practitioners have proposed many 
conceptual frameworks, including the state-based approach (Ammann et al., 2002) and 
the host-based approach (Ammann et al., 2005), to reduce the unauthorized access to data 
and thereby to mitigate cyber-attacks.  These conceptual frameworks are useful for 
understanding the behaviors of cyber-attackers and preventing any possible attacks.  
Specially, the host-based approach allows an organization to monitor its network and 
discover vulnerabilities in the broadband access network.  Additionally, it enables an 
organization to have a clear view of its measurement performance metrics to establish the 
service level agreements for providing guaranteed and business class services.  
Sheyner et al. (2002) recommended the Boolean minimization approach to permit 
managers to have an in-depth understanding of the risk management methodology to 
identify the likely attack path based on attack surface measures.  Consequently, the 
British Standard BS 7799, the International Standards Organization 17799 (ISO 17799), 
generally accepted information security principles (GAISP), system security engineering 
capability maturity model (SSE-CMM), and the standard of good practice for information 
security have stipulated the best security practices for the stakeholders of all 
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organizations.  The objective of these security best practices is to guide an organization to 
protect assets from internal human factor threats and outsider threats.  Additionally, 
FISMA and NIST have recommended mandatory security controls to reduce epidemic 
data breaches or systems attacks.   
Furthermore, other security practitioners such as Swain and Guttman (1983) have 
emphasized that human errors could be a result of organizational conditions, including 
work layout, poor environmental conditions, insufficient human engineering design, 
inadequate training and job aids, and inadequate supervision.  Other researchers such as 
Perrow (1984), Roberts (1990), Sagan (1994), and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) indicated 
that organizational culture has an impact on human errors.  Although these authors called 
attention to these issues decades ago, it is interesting that their findings are still relevant 
today. In Chapter 4, the study results showed the impacts of internal human factor threats 
on data breaches, underscoring the theoretical foundation of the primary research theory.  
The Swiss cheese model focuses on hidden failures within the causal sequence of events.  
This model is a theoretical framework and is not a prescriptive investigation technique 
with some application to a real-world problem.  The study results showed that top 
managers and IT managers should identify the problems, their magnitude, and their 
importance to detect and correct before an accident (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997).  
These findings should help managers implement security measures to reduce internal 
human factor threats. 
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Interpretation of Findings 
Managers should monitor their information systems and data vigilantly because of 
changing work ethics, the mobility of employees, interconnected devices of employees, 
and perspective about corporate data.  The truism “amateurs hack systems, while 
professionals hack people” has relevance as security technologies designed to stop 
hackers, spies, phishers, and frauds are compromised by human weaknesses, namely 
inattention, incompetence, and complacency.  The study results revealed that the 
behaviors of employees are a key risk factor to compromised information assets (see 
Aytes & Connolly, 2003).  Internal human factor threats are common in most 
organizations and could continue to be the case.  For instance, 73% and 18% were 
outsiders and insiders, respectively, among 600 breaches analyzed in Verizon’s (2013) 
data breach investigation report.   
The latest report (Verizon, 2014) also revealed similar results, with 72% of 
breaches involving outsiders, whereas 25% were related to insiders.  The limited 
commitment from top executives to ensure the availability of sufficient resources for 
organization-wide risk management programs contributed to internal human errors and 
factor threats.  The IBM Cyber-Security Intelligence Index Report (2015) indicated that 
55% of attacks were carried out by either malicious insiders or inadvertent actors and 
could have potential impacts on successfully executing organizational missions and 
business functions if senior leaders or executives are not committed to making risk 
management a fundamental mission.  Most organizations appeared to address risk as a 
strategic capability and an enabler of missions and business functions across 
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organizations.  As a result, they did not manage information security risk organization-
wide to address the following essential elements: 
• assignment of risk management responsibilities to top managers; 
• ongoing recognition and understanding by top managers about information 
security risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 
organizations, and the Nation; 
• establishing and communicating organizational risk tolerance throughout the 
organization including the guidance about the impacts of tolerance on ongoing 
decision-making activities; and 
• accountability by top managers for their risk management decisions and the 
implementation of effective and organization-wide risk management 
programs. 
Thus, most top managers in Ivory Coast did not appear to have established a joint 
task force with security institutions because the existence of an organization is part of the 
IoT.  Despite employees of many Ivorian organizations carrying mobile devices to their 
workplace, many organizations did not have any security measures to regulate the 
growing number of BYODs or understand internal human factors risk and mitigation as a 
part of their critical responsibilities.  The behaviors of employees and managers are the 
key contributors to ensure the security of data and information systems and to prevent 
damage from malicious or unintentional attacks or data breaches (Banerjee et al., 1998).  
The absence of an effective ethical security climate could impact the ethical behavioral 
intention of employees in protecting an organization’s data and systems. 
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Security Awareness 
Inadequate security awareness training could prevent employees from 
transitioning from the most significant security risk to the greatest security asset.  Thus, 
information security is predominantly about educating employees.  Top managers should 
recognize that explicit and well-informed decisions are essential to balance benefits 
gained from the use of information systems with associated risks such as purposeful 
attacks, environmental disruptions, or human errors causing mission or business failures.  
Information security risk requires the best collective judgments of individuals and groups 
who are responsible for strategic planning, oversight, management, and day-to-day 
operations.   
Hence, protection of assets from internal human factor threats is crucial for 
managers because the business survival of the IoT is data and information.  Top 
managers did not seem to take actions to: 
• motivate employees to follow policies and procedures, 
• stop employees from opening suspicious email attachments, 
• greatly minimizing the damage done in the event of an attack, 
• prevent the weak link targeting from internal and external threats, 
• avert damage from revenge hacking by disgruntled employees, 
• ensure employees take password protection seriously, and 
• maintain zero workplace violence. 
A successful organization should focus on people, processes, and technology in a 
similar order.  Technology provides automatic safeguards and processes; however, 
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managers should provide security awareness to end users because even organizations 
with strong security practices are vulnerable to human error (Soerjadibrata et al., 2010).  
Often, focus on the people is insufficient, but it is critical to raising awareness about their 
carelessness.  Thus, technology and processes must be combined with employee 
education so employees are aware of threats and can guard against them.  The safety of 
an organization relies on continuous education of employees about identifying suspicious 
communications and new possible risks. 
Detect, Deny, and Disrupt Internal Attacks 
Twenty-one of the participants mentioned that they are unsure if their 
organizations could withstand cyber-attacks because most organizations’ managers did 
not know their assets, what to look for, how to detect and disrupt internal human factor 
threats.  Further, the participants pointed out that full features of existing security systems 
have not been activated in the organization, that is, managers use only default settings or 
do not implement threat intelligence services.  Most organizations did not have relevant 
data inventory or data were captured, retained, or shared correctly.   Companies with 
outdated SIEM, firewalls, and endpoint protection did not have real-time correlation and 
fine-grained rules, which prevented from elevating the criticality of primary indicators.  
A mature IT security or IT operation department should build their defenses to address 
the betrayal or mistake by an insider and remain alert against external threats.  
Architecture and toolsets should be flexible and capable of looking inside and outside the 
organization to detect and mitigate threats to data security.  In August 2015, the FBI 
reported that the loss due to the scam phishing business email was over $1.2 billion (FBI, 
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2015).  Many organizations in Ivory coast did not seem to have proper security measures 
to combat in real time internal human factor threats or cyber-attacks. 
Data Collection and Aggregation 
Some practitioners such as Malathi and Baboo (2011) argued that it is critical for 
an organization to understand complex typology of data collection, retention, and 
aggregation across functional boundaries, product silos and organizational groups.  The 
key consideration is the identification of the most valuable for an organization.  However, 
twenty participants in this study mentioned that security and IT teams do not work in 
collaboration as business partners, leading to difficulty in identifying critical assets, 
developing baseline for appropriate assets use (i.e., applications, users, time of the day, 
and typical workloads), relevant indicators of an attack, and security.  For example, an 
accounting database server could have sensitive data, communicate using specific ports 
and protocols, have a finite set of approved applications and users working within typical 
workdays, and occasional peaks such as end-of-month reporting.  An attacker could 
attempt to exploit the SQL vulnerabilities in a database or operating system, which can be 
mitigated through countermeasures, such as application whitelisting, database activity 
monitoring, and network intrusion-based prevention.  According to the results of this 
study, many companies do not document and baseline their assets for IT team to set alerts 
for and act on any unusual behavior.  Despite growing threats with mobile devices in 
workplace, most IT teams do not have adequate number of skillful workers to identify the 
internal hosts attacks and have the visibility into the internal hosts as well as the 
correlation with unusual port or protocol combinations, for example, initiation of a 
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sudden communication by a database server over port 80 via FTP (IoA 2), which could 
be identified by a baseline profile.  Similarly, the database server could communicate to a 
system in the DMZ (IoA 3), which could be the path for data theft; however, most 
organizations do not have the visibility for data breaches because they still use traditional 
unencrypted data storage methods.  
Internal Human Factor Threats and Responsibility for Preventing Data Breaches  
Internal human factor threats are considered generally as an organizational failure, 
that is, human resources, managers, executive officers, and IT departments are 
responsible in some way for actions of an insider.  In some cases, IT department could be 
responsible for not detecting malicious activity due to incorrect implementation of 
technical tools, though the department is not empowered in some cases to detect and 
mitigate the activity due to maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IT 
systems.  Malicious insider activities are typically driven by some ideological or 
psychological disagreements with the mission or values of the organization.  However, 
detection of such situation is the responsibility of managers, not the IT department.  
Although outsiders are more likely to act maliciously with data of an organization, the 
source of the highest risk is generally employees.   
External hackers are looking continuously for the weaknesses to exploit and the 
most significant vulnerability is the carelessness, ineffective security deployments or 
misguided actions by insiders.  Employees could fall victims to phishing schemes or 
social engineering attacks, or they open unrecognized emails, or they access corporate 
systems while sitting in an internet café.  The participants of this study revealed that data 
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protection applications are not up-to-date and the business continuity plans almost do not 
exist or at the highest risk of not working.  Furthermore, the participants outlined that the 
following employee behaviors unknowingly created security risks in several ways and 
provided access to external sources to cause damage to the organization: 
• carelessness with emails; 
• negligence with mailings;  
• password sharing and recycling;  
• loss or theft of IT assets; and  
• not using encryption. 
Limitation of the Study 
In this study, I did not investigate all organizations in Abidjan or any other 
organizations outside Abidjan, Ivory Coast.  There were no community partners from 
Abidjan involved in this study.  Additionally, there was the possibility that some 
participants provided diverse answers to survey, questionnaire and interview questions 
because of their cultural and ethnic differences.  To minimize such risk, I provided the 
same set of questions to the experimental and control groups used in this study.  
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (2013) found that human tendencies and cognitive biases 
influence human behaviors.    
Schneier (2008) discussed extensively various risks and the inability of humans to 
assess the magnitude of risks within an organization correctly.  Furthermore, he studied 
human limitation in accessing risks and underlined the following five critical methods, 
through which people incorrectly assess the magnitude of risks:  
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• exaggerating spectacular and rare risks, whereas downplaying more common 
risks; 
• experiencing difficulties in determining risks outside of their normal situation;  
• underestimating risks under control and overestimating risks out of control;  
• perceiving personal risks to be higher than anonymous risks; and 
• overestimating risks that are the object of public discussion (CMU/SEI-2013-
TN-022 | 13 2008).  
Many of the factors associated with malicious insider crimes, particularly those 
relating to motivational factors, did not seem to play a role in unintentional insider threats 
(UIT) cases.  Reactions to failure tend to focus on individual employee, who committed 
the error, instead of developing strategies to avoid it by examining work environment and 
systems (Dekker, 2002).  Dekker (2002) divided a system into a proximal sharp end 
(including people, who are in direct contact with critical processes) and a distal blunt end 
(an organization that shapes, drives, and supports activities at sharp end).  In addition to 
providing resources, blunt end creates constraints and pressures that can lead to errors at 
the sharp end. 
Recommendations 
Building a Culture of Trust 
Executive managers in an organization must nurture a culture of trust between 
organization and insiders.  Organizations with a high level of insider risks should expand 
their insider threat and security awareness programs.  Additionally, technical and 
management controls should be placed in locations, where managers trust their insiders, 
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to assist them to perform trusted responsibilities without a problem.  Furthermore, 
managers should foster a culture that makes an organization worthy of trust in return.  
Therefore, cultivating a culture of trust could help to mitigate cyber-threats because 
insider attacks or insider mistakes are not expected and often not detected.  The former 
president of U.S., Ronald Reagan, said that “trust but verify” backgrounds and actions of 
your insiders before handing over digital keys to your systems.  Thus, security measures 
are necessary to curtail data breaches and insider errors. 
Minimizing Data Breaches and Human Factor Threats 
The best approach is to implement different layers of security by conducting 
background checks, implementing a policy of least privilege, and regularly reviewing and 
revoking data access privilege.  Furthermore, implementing role-based control for access 
to any critical data, ensuring the logging, and capturing successes and failures could be 
useful.  Data loss prevention software could help businesses to filter the internet traffic, 
prevent critical data from being mailed offsite, and protect end-points from being used 
maliciously.   
In contrast, a robust patch management strategy and a periodic vulnerability 
assessment could help to prevent the outside attackers in addition to different layers of 
security using anti-virus solutions, network behavior analysis, and log monitoring.  
Furthermore, it is important for an organization to avoid ad-hoc handling of sensitive 
information.  Although top managers strives to secure their corporate applications and 
infrastructure, the porting of information from these protected environments in a 
distributed manner, using many other computing devices including laptops, phones, 
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cloud, and to devices outside of company’s domain, could create the most significant 
threat to data security.  
Top managers of organizations should establish and continuously improve their 
information security policies to address access, handling, communication, and storage of 
corporate information.  Otherwise, productivity and morale of employees reduce.  
Despite credible risks posed by inside and outside threats to enterprises and 
organizations, human costs of insider threats are significant for managers to identify the 
potential source of threats and monitor their activities.  Similarly, business costs of 
outside threats could result in closing down of a company. 
Preventive Measures to Minimize Internal Employee Human Factor Threats 
Management of an organization should be prepared to tackle emerging cyber-
threats.  Minimizing threats requires an understanding of the threat characteristics by the 
insiders such as employees or trusted third parties, resulting from the pressure after 
reorganizations or transfers and grievances.  Additionally, external factors such as the 
status of a relationship, unexpected expenses or health-related issues could lead to the 
careless attitude among employees.  The non-technical staff and contractors, such as 
lawyers, with some level of access to data, could be another source of unintentional 
insider threats for both business-to-business and business-to-customer companies.  Thus, 
it is important to provide a proper training for staff on security practices, although it is 
difficult to train and control external contractors with the access to data or systems.  
Consequently, control of their access to data should be through software measures and 
contractual agreements.  Monitoring insider threats are generally the primary 
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responsibility of the human resources department during the hiring process through 
various internal employee background checks, security, and IT teams.  Security teams 
should use external cyber-activity monitoring tools to extract online activities such as 
posts, rants, and tweets that could indicate whether a threat is imminent.  In general, 
cyber-criminals exploit credit cards or bank account of an organization, though they 
could extract information and use them in social engineering or other schemes.  
The overall market costs due to compromised accounts or personal records are in 
the order of million dollars across the world with the significant reputational costs to the 
trusted organization, the identity of which has been used to trick employees because it is 
difficult to regain the trust of customers.  Implementing proper security measures to 
prevent insider and outsider threats depend on the business model along with data 
collection and utilization to achieve the mission.  In the case of insider threats, managing 
risks should extend across the malicious, negligence and accidental risky behaviors.  
Additionally, managers should: 
• have a zero tolerance for workplace policy breach based on the Denise Brown 
McZinc group behaviors approach, that is, forming-storming-norming-
performing.  Four phases are necessary for the team to grow, face up to the 
challenges, tackle problems, find solutions, plan work and deliver results.  
Additionally, strong communication skills of the leaders could help to build 
trust and establish group collaboration among employees; 
• be sensitive to changes in their industry; 
• secure compliance data or documentation;  
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• pay attention to the legacy of IT systems;  
• having a disaster preparation readiness plan; 
• bring known flaws to forefront;  
• Develop a proper identity and access management plan for data, applications, 
and systems; 
• move data or partial data to the cloud; 
• monitor sensitive data; and 
• build cyber-defense.  
Furthermore, managers should implement at least the following security measures 
to curtail growing cyber-attacks and prevent internal human factor threats:  
• have a process to identify assets and vulnerabilities; 
• identify likely attack methods;  
• identify privileged accounts and credentials;  
• established proactive and reactive strategies;  
• have no Windows power user groups; 
• multifactor authentication; 
• employees controls; 
• risk assessment; 
• password management system; 
• BYOD policy; 
• security controls; 
• security policies; 
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• have data variable length deduplication; 
• deploy encryption in motion across all platforms; and 
• use agile methodologies of development and operations, which is a 
collaboration between lines of business, development and IT operations. 
The crucial next approach is to establish the tolerance for risk in the organization 
by identifying factors to measure such as life, health and safety, environmental 
protection, and intellectual property, and the degree of severity of an impact, that is, 
production loss or financial impact.  Managers could articulate the impacts of a 
compromised device or component, information or systems environment by setting the 
tolerance levels.  Consequently, managers could change the attitude of employees to the 
consequence-based approach from What could happen? and What if something happens? 
to When something happens, how bad will it be? The focus could move to mitigation 
controls to minimize the impacts.  With continuous improvement to both network and 
endpoint security, these hybrid techniques are likely to increase.  It is critical for 
organizations to ensure they have proper controls, audit, and protection to detect and 
trace insider threats. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
The following recommendations for further research could expand the 
understanding about cyber-threats to organizations: 
• investigating factors contributing to careless acts and technical problems that 
lead to insider human errors together with the development of effective 
mitigation strategies;  
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• investigating ineffectiveness of leaders to build a culture of shared ownership 
for cyber-risks;  
• investigating about setting up partnerships between public and private sectors 
and ensuring that the leadership engages and supports cyber-security 
programs; 
• examining the role of managers in avoiding issues between the Ivory Coast 
ethnic groups and political groups that could lead to malicious attacks; and 
• examining the data protection process used by organizations in Abidjan to 
minimize internal human errors. 
Cyber-security continues to lag in Africa, resulting in delays in implementing a 
resilient cyber-security.  Training and awareness programs have their limits and 
organizations could not eliminate human errors associated with risk perceptions and other 
cognitive or decision-making processes.  A comprehensive mitigation strategy should 
include novel and effective automatic safeguards against human factor threats.   
Malicious insider threat and UIT have many common contributing factors in areas such 
as security practice, organizational processes, management practices, and security 
culture.  However, they also have significant differences, for example, human errors play 
a significant role in UIT.  Therefore, UIT mitigations should focus on strategies for 
improving productive work environments, healthy security cultures, and human factors 
that increase the usability and security of the system and decrease the likelihood of 
human errors.    
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Observable Reflection by the Researcher 
Due to the interdependence in growing global digital economy, failure of one 
organization could affect many other organizations, especially with businesses becoming 
a part of the IoT.  Because governments, enterprises, and other organizations are not 
restricted within a controlled perimeter in the current environment, they require a novel 
security strategy for integrated ecosystems.  Many organizations in Ivory Coast do not 
protect themselves against growing threat of cyber-criminals.  The methods used for daily 
business transactions have not evolved and still rely on outdated technology without any 
significant cyber-security protection.  Consequently, many government and private 
industries are vulnerable to cyber-attack.  Some Africans have little trust in governments, 
particularly on repressive or autocratic leadership, and said that officials spy on the 
citizens.  Additionally, lack of information sharing due to ethnic and political divisions 
within private and public sectors significantly affects the fight against cyber-crimes.  
The IoT could provide an increased accessibility to criminals to exploit naive 
users with limited experience with technology to introduce viruses and malware in 
government and business information systems.  In Ivory Coast like other African 
countries, skills shortages and lack of education about potential cyber-threats are the 
primary reasons for the lack of protection against cyber-attacks.  Ivory Coast government 
expects other donors to build their cyber-ecosystems instead of allocating funds for 
cyber-security defense.  This passive attitude could be detrimental in the context of 
increasing cyber-attacks because internal homegrown solutions are effective in protecting 
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data and information systems.  Therefore, the African governments initiate programs to 
develop their cyber-security defense reflecting their unique social environment.  
Therefore, African countries should develop their protection solutions against 
cyber-threats internally rather than solely relying on outsiders.  Additionally, the Ivory 
Coast government and private sectors must not launch their e-systems without 
guaranteeing security.  Otherwise, e-systems for crucial national systems and 
infrastructure should be on a separate network through a secure network.  In general, 
emails of many organizations are insecure, and criminal organization could exploit email 
to breach security quickly and easily.  Therefore, it is critical to implement the use of 
secure sockets layer (SSL) certificates for the communications between simple mail 
transfer protocol (SMTP) servers and the public essential infrastructure (PKI) SSL/PKI 
certificates for SMTP server to client communications. 
Implications 
The primary implication of this study is that the identification of internal risk 
factors is the primary step to overcome internal human factors threats and data breaches 
in organizations.  With the increasing use of mobile devices and laptops, management 
should have a clear visibility about internal network access (i.e., Internet and intranet) 
and IT assets.  Employees, executives, suppliers, or partners of an organization are the 
common sources of data risks and problems due to the following reasons: 
• Organizations allocate security and training budgets based on an inadequate 
understanding of business risks and compliance requirements of privacy laws, 
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trends and technologies, and therefore are poorly prepared to adequately 
safeguard data within their environment. 
• Due to the lack of continuity between the roles and departments, data can pass 
through several people and it is difficult to track the activities of each 
individual, increasing the risk of data mishandling. 
• Because most insider attacks are not reported, it is difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of certain third-party security measures.  Additionally, it is 
unrealistic to expect anyone to make correct procurement or hiring decisions 
if he or she does not understand problem, risk, law, or technology.  
• Training and awareness programs about privacy and digital diligence for 
every employee are critical to understanding the impacts of their role and 
actions on data and security.  However, most training programs are inadequate 
across government and private organizations. 
Potential Implications for Social Change 
The results of this study could help top management to understand internal human 
factor threats and potential mitigation strategies to avoid data breaches.  Additionally, 
knowledge generated in this study has extended cyber-security literature, especially in the 
Ivory Coast, where there was little information about the state of cyber-security.  This 
study results also provide both categorical and theoretical knowledge that may be 
considered by academia, industry, government, and public at large.  In the context of 
increasing data breaches and social scrutiny over data breaches, it is critical for 
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organizations to prevent every data breach because one data breach could impact millions 
of people.   
Information security is a part of the strategic business security strategy of an 
organization.  An attack on unprotected or poorly protected information systems could 
cause the loss of confidence in the institution and lower the stock price (Telang & Wattal, 
2007).  Overcoming internal human factor threats should focus on maintaining a 
productive data flow, work setting, work planning and control, and employee readiness.  
For example, implementing widely tested and implemented security best practices 
throughout the organization as stipulated by practitioners and government agencies such 
as NIST in the industry should impact internal human factor threats mitigation goals 
positively.  Furthermore, educating managers and employees should mitigate data 
breaches and overcome internal human threats.  The compilation of the results of this 
study could help to improve awareness of the leaders and employees of cyber-security 
threats (Table 16).  Combining the vigilance of humans with advancements in technology 
could enable an organization to build many layers of protection to improve cyber-security 
risk management to achieve business objectives. 
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Table 16  
Tactics to Educate Leaders of Organizations  
 
 
163 
 
 
Conclusions  
Increased use of computer and mobile devices together with the digitalization of 
businesses operations requires an informed and knowledgeable manager, who 
understands vulnerabilities and threats to data and information assets of the organization 
and develops strategies to overcome internal human factor threats to protect data and 
assets.  Without strong security measures, a disgruntled employee could share data and 
information with a competitor because employees know the type and storage locations of 
sensitive data.     
Because of the lack of understanding and training, some employees could provide 
access to digital intruders unintentionally.  Additionally, the source of most data breaches 
is the insider of a company accidentally or intentionally.  Breaches through a contractor 
or other service providers, for example, in the case of the Wyndham hotels, Target, and 
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the Home Depot breaches, are another common type of breaches.  Therefore, it is 
essential to develop and continuously update a robust internal security policy to educate 
employees and mitigate risk.  Although it is impossible to eliminate every threat, 
organizations could have protocols that could minimize the damage due to an internal 
data breach.  Top managers should consider the resource tradeoffs that the time is taken 
to ensure a safe culture versus maximizing the output, creativity, speed, and worker 
satisfaction.  Individuals do not consider risk consciously when facing high workloads 
and tight deadlines.  Managers should focus on risk avoidance strategies, for example, 
proactive system designs versus reactive ones and negligence versus normal security and 
usability.  In summary, the occurrence of an internal data breach threat factor without at 
least a negligent action by an insider is relatively rare.  
The policies and controls dealing with a data breach, for example, the employee 
security training and organizational information security policy, fine-grained access 
controls, and comprehensive network monitoring could improve breach vulnerability.  
Top managers should be responsible for improving cyber-security because the global 
payment systems, private customer data, critical control systems, and core intellectual 
property are at risk.  Managers have the responsibility to understand the security 
intelligence maturity level of their organizations based on their IT security and business 
risk posture.  Additionally, managers should evaluate the appetite of organizations for 
risks based on their capabilities to mitigate and plan to close any potential security gaps.  
With proper application of new security technology and strong public-private 
partnerships, organizations could protect their information systems assets and could 
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become robust and resilient.  However, poorly implemented IT security rules and 
procedures could hinder organizations from achieving the mission and could impact 
customer privacy adversely. 
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Appendix A: Survey 
1. What are the biggest internal challenges facing you today as a 
security professional? 
 
2. As an information system (IS) person what do you recommend 
overcoming these challenges? 
3. How do you deal with workplace violence that may jeopardize 
organizations data or information? 
 
4. What recommendations can you suggest to reduce workplace 
violence? 
 
5. What are the root causes of insider accidental threats? 
 
6. What recommendations would you like to suggest mitigating 
insider accidental threats that may compromise an organization’s data? 
 
7. What are the root causes of insider deliberate threat? 
 
8. What recommendations would you like to suggest reducing insider 
deliberate threats that may compromise an organization’s data? 
 
9. What trainings do you think are more effective? 
 
10. In what areas would you like further training to do your job more 
effectively? 
 
11. In your opinion, what precautionary measures do you think 
management can use to minimize insider threats? 
(12) Please indicate the degree of importance below (Highly important = 
4, very important = 3, important = 2, and little important = 1) associated 
with the following topics in carrying out your security management 
responsibilities. 
Security Management 
 
National Industrial Security Program (NISP) 
Operating Manual (OM)  implementation [ ] 
 
National Industrial Security Program (NISP) 
Operating Manual (OM)  Changes [ ] 
 Risk management strategies [ ] 
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Risk management best practices [ ] 
 
Cyber-security threats [ ] 
 
Cyber-security trends [ ] 
 
Security Contingency Plan (SCP) vulnerability 
rating matrix [ ] 
 
Need to know  based access [ ] 
 
Systems and Applications documentation [ ] 
 Operations security (OPSEC) [ ] 
 Cyber espionage [ ] 
 
Security Contingency Plan (SCP) [ ] 
Internal Security Contingency Plan (SCP) 
security  policy [ ] 
 Insider threat program [ ] 
 Social engineering exploit techniques [ ] 
  
Personnel Security 
 
 
Effective security awareness [ ] 
 
Effective Security training techniques [ ] 
 How to improve your briefing skills [ ] 
 
Security clearance processing [ ]  
 
Adjudication (Man making decision) [ ] 
 
legal issues (regarding protecting personal 
information) [ ] 
 
Conducting effective security self-inspections [ 
] 
 Security violation prevention [ ] 
  
182 
 
 
Information Systems Security 
 
 
Employee Internet Access (EIAS) security 
requirements [ ] 
 How to manage a contamination incident [ ] 
 
 
Computer security fundamentals [ ] 
 
 
Network security fundamentals [ ] 
 
 
Reporting requirements for cyber intrusions [ ] 
 
 
Fundamentals of information security systems 
[ ] 
  
Information Security 
 
 
Phishing [ ] 
 
Hacking [ ] 
 
Social networking risks [ ] 
 
Identity theft techniques [ ] 
 
Data breach countermeasures [ ] 
 Mobile device security risks [ ] 
 Critical infrastructure threats [ ] 
 How to conduct vulnerability assessments [ ] 
 
Proprietary information protection strategies [ 
] 
  
Physical Security 
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Disaster planning [ ] 
 
Disaster recovery [ ] 
 
Workplace crime [ ] 
 
Workplace loss prevention [ ] 
 Access control technologies [ ] 
 
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF) construction standards [ ] 
 Classified storage program [ ] 
 
How to protect your information from physical 
threats [ ] 
  
Global Security Issues 
 
 
Protecting business operations [ ] 
 
Zero tolerance of violence at workplace [ ] 
 
 
Understanding Export Controls [ ] 
 
Understanding business economic espionage 
threats [ ] 
 
Global terrorism [ ] 
 
Domestic terrorism [ ] 
 
Cyber warfare techniques [ ] 
 
Cyber warfare tactics [ ] 
 Critical infrastructure threats [ ] 
  
Professional Development 
 
 How to have a sustainable security budget [ ] 
 How to excel at managing people [ ] 
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 Effective Communication Skills [ ] 
 
How to communicate security risks to senior 
management [ ] 
 
Proving your value as a security professional [ 
] 
  
(13) Please, briefly describe any security issues.  
(14) Please, list three most challenge internal security threats. 
Security Awareness training 
(15) Please indicate your level of interest in participating in continued 
security awareness training by clicking on the box below to select your 
choice (Very interested = 3, Moderate interest = 2, No interest = 1) 
(16) What if any, of the following topics would you be interested in 
learning more about in an extended security awareness training 
workshop. (check all that apply) 
 
    How to Develop A Technology Control Plan 
    Understanding Export Control Requirements 
    OPSEC Planning and Requirements 
     Creating Effective Security Policies 
     Creating Effective Security Procedures 
     Special Access Program Orientation 
     Train the Trainer Workshop 
     Information System Security Basics 
(17) Do you have an interest in a security awareness training session 
that is not listed above? If so, please describe it. 
(18) Please indicate the degree of importance (Extremely important=4, 
Moderately important=3, and Not important=1) the following factors 
have on your decision to implement a security awareness training event. 
                 Location 
                 Speakers/Instructors 
                 Amount of time away 
                 Conference content 
                 Peer interaction, networking 
                 Registration fee 
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                 Time of year 
  
(19) Your Comments: Please use this space below to offer any 
additional suggestions or comments that you believe would enhance the 
security awareness training to alleviate data breaches and overcome 
internal threats. 
(20) Will you be interested in having continuous security awareness 
training (Yes = 4, Very likely = 3, Not likely = 2, and no = 1)?         
(21) If not, please tell me why: 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire 
 
1) Please indicate below the incident types that occur in your organization 
Incident Type (Check only one and where a selected box=1) 
Root Compromise 
User Compromise 
Loss or Theft of IT Asset 
(e.g., Computers, Laptops, Routers, Printers; 
Removable Media; CD/DVD, flash drive, 
floppy) 
Disclosure of Sensitive Data 
Sensitive data includes 
infrastructure/configuration data, packages lost 
during shipment, hardcopy records, personally 
identifiable information (PII) of individuals, 
including personnel and job applicant 
information, tax information (including tax 
information of corporations). 
Denial of Service 
Malicious Code 
Policy Non-Compliance 
Unauthorized Access and/or Penetration  
      Attempt 
Probe/Scan 
Phishing/Social Engineering 
Misuse of Resources/Policy Violation 
Exercise/Response Testing 
 
2) When did the incident occur, Day/Night?    
3) Where did the incident happen? 
 
4) Describe the circumstances of the "Disclosure of Sensitive Data" incident: (Check only  
      one) 
Package lost during shipment 
Error in Faxing 
Error in E-mailing 
Machine/manual stuffing, processing 
      or computer programming error 
Invalid/Incomplete written/Oral    
       authorization 
Misrepresentation of identity or authority 
Established procedures inadequate to  
       establish customer’s or representative's   
       identity 
      
Established procedures to confirm  
       customer's identity not followed 
      
Please, describe other (s)   
 
 
5) Type of Location where the incident occurred (Check only one) 
Electronic  
      Transmission or 
      Processing Error 
Hotel   
Company Facility 
Public  
Residence 
Vehicle 
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Client Site 
During Shipment 
       Transportation  
Other   
 
 
If the incident occurred during shipment (Yes=2, No=1, and unknown=0): 
6) Was the local Mail Coordinator notified?  Yes No  
 
7) Shipping Company:  
(e.g., Post Office/internal mailing) 
 
 
8) Was the Asset Lost or Stolen? 
Lost 
 Stolen 
 
 
9) If the Asset was Stolen, was it stolen from a locked area? 
Yes 
 No 
 Unknown  
 
 
10) If the Asset was Stolen, were there signs of forced entry? 
Yes 
 No 
 Unknown  
 
 
11) If Lost or Stolen at an XZB Facility, what was the specific storage location of the Asset? 
       Desk Cabinet Storage Room Other    
 
 
12) If Lost or Stolen at an XZB Facility, was the specific storage location of the Asset  
       locked? 
Yes      No 
 Unknown  
 
 
13) If Lost or Stolen from a Vehicle, where was the Asset located in the Vehicle? 
Trunk  
Interior 
 Exterior  
 
 
14) Type of Asset Lost or Stolen (Check all that apply) 
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Laptop 
Desktop 
 
BlackBerry   
Thumb  
Drive   
CD Rom 
Floppy 
Phone  
Backup tape or other media 
Other    
 
 
15) Was Enterprise Disk Encryption (EDE) installed on the laptop? 
Yes 
 No 
 Unknown 
 
 
16) Was the device powered off? 
Yes  
 No 
 Unknown 
 Not Applicable  
 
 
17) Was the cable lock engaged? 
Yes 
 No 
 Unknown Not Applicable  
 
 
18) Does XZB have Internal Review Code (IRC)? 
 
Yes 
 No 
 Not Applicable 
 
19)  Is SBU data protected by law (e.g., confidential data or data that can be used to impair  
       business processes, system configurations, and/or identify weaknesses)? 
Yes  
  No  
 
 
 
20) What type of risks do you think that employees pose? 
 
21) Lastly, please provide below any additional roots causes of internal human factors 
that contribute to data breaches and compromised information. 
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Appendix C: Interview Questions 
 
Part I- Dealing with malicious insiders and unintentional insiders risks 
1. What type of security measures do you think adequate to reduce internal human 
errors? 
2. What type of security solutions do you think management should implement to reduce 
risks posed by malicious employees? 
3. What type of security solutions do you think management should put in place to 
reduce risks posed by unintentional employees? 
4. How do you secure data to address the insider human element of an organization? 
5. Where does sensitive data reside across your enterprise?  
6. How can your organization reduce the cost of expanding data protection needs? 
7. How can your company meet audit compliance requirements? 
Part II- Employees data access and responsibilities 
Using a 1 to 5 scale where (not often, 1= somewhat often, 2= often, 3= somewhat very 
often, & 5= very often).  Please place a check mark in front of your answer. 
 8. Please rate your overall experience with data access and protection. 
Not often   
Somewhat often   
Often 
Somewhat very often 
Very Often 
 
9. Is information security only IT responsibility? 
 
Not often   
Somewhat often   
Often 
190 
 
Somewhat very often 
Very Often 
         
10. Do you have internal data protection policies? If so, 
Not often   
Somewhat often   
Often 
Somewhat very often 
Very Often 
 
11. How data protection is enforced? 
 
Not often   
Somewhat often   
Often 
Somewhat very often 
Very Often 
 
Part III- Please indicate the degree of agreement below (Strongly agree =5, agree =4, 
disagree =3, strongly disagree =2, and unsure =1) associate with the following topics 
regarding the state of Cyber-defense within your organization. Please place a check mark 
in front of your answer. 
12. Do you agree that cybersecurity threats sometimes fall through the crack of existing 
security systems? 
Strongly agree   
Agree   
Disagree   
Strongly disagree   
Unsure 
 
13. Do you agree that your company is protected from advanced cyber-attacks? 
Strongly agree   
Agree   
Disagree   
Strongly disagree   
Unsure 
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14. Do you agree that your company’ security can stop insider cybercriminals from 
stealing corporate information? 
Strongly agree   
Agree   
Disagree   
Strongly disagree   
Unsure 
 
15. Do you concur that it is possible to implement a security program that can withstand 
all targeted insider attacks? 
      Strongly agree   
Agree   
Disagree   
Strongly disagree   
Unsure 
16. Can your organization monitor sensitive data? 
Strongly agree   
Agree   
Disagree   
Strongly disagree   
Unsure 
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Appedix D: Results  - Survey, Questionnaire, and Interview Questions 
 
RQ1-What are the internal human factors that contribute to data breaches and 
compromised information in Ivory Coast emerging business environments?  
Res_Savy1_v1.xlsx
 
RQ2– What are the root causes of internal human factors that contribute to data 
breaches and compromised information in Ivory Coast businesses? 
Res_Ques2_v1.xlsx
 
RQ3- What preventative measures can management use to minimize the threat 
from internal employee human factors that contribute to data breaches or compromised 
information? 
Res_Inter3-v1.xlsx
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Appendix E: Emergent Themes 
 
RQ1–  What are the internal human factors that contribute to data breaches and 
compromised information in Ivory Coast emerging business environments?  
 
       Internal Security Challenges and Recommendations 
        Workplace Violence Impact on Organizations Data or Information 
        Insider Accidental Threats Causes and Mitigations 
        Precautionary Measures to Minimize Insider Threats 
        Security Awareness Training 
 
RQ2– What are the root causes of internal human factors that contribute to data 
breaches and compromised information in Ivory Coast businesses?  
   
      Organizations Incident Types 
       Disclosure of Sensitive Data 
       Data Protection 
       Employees internal risk factors 
 
RQ3- What preventative measures can management use to minimize the threat 
from internal employee human factors that contribute to data breaches or compromised 
information? 
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       Dealing with malicious insiders and unintentional insiders risks 
        Security Measures to Reduce Internal Human Errors 
        Sensitive Data Dwelling  
        Reducing Big Data Cost 
        Employees data access and responsibilities 
        Data Access and Responsibilities 
        Cyber-defense 
        Cyber-defense State 
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Appendix F: Research Flyer for Participants 
 
Overcoming Data Breaches and Human Factors in Minimizing Threats to 
Cyber-security Ecosystems in Ivory Coast 
 
*I am conducting this Study for my Walden Dissertation*. 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION 
To find out more about this study, please contact:  
 Pierre M. Ayereby 
 43-45-06-78  
 Manouan.ayereby@waldenu.edu 
 
Principal Researcher: Pierre M. Ayereby 
The purpose of this research is to provide 
executives with a framework to guide them in 
deciding how to prevent data breaches from 
cyber-threats by focusing on internal human 
behavior. 
 To participate in this research, you must:  
 Be Government Ministers 
 Be Department Heads 
 Be CFOs 
 Be Branch Managers 
 Be Chief Information Officers (CIO) 
 Be IT Division Managers 
 Be Information Systems Technicians          
 Have at least three years of experience in your   
      roles  
 Complete the research questions, not on your  
      organization’ s Times   
 
Participation in this study involves: 
 Complete a survey within two to three days 
 Complete a questionnaire within two to three days 
 Complete a 30-minute one-on- one face-to-face interview 
 Make a time commitment of 1 hour in the second week from the research starting date, 
 In a designated hotel meeting room, in Rivera, Abidjan 
 You will receive no compensation-Your participation is voluntary 
 
